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I. INTRODUCION
The creation of the United Nations Compensation Commis-
sion ("UNCC") to pay damages to those injured by Iraq's invasion
and occupation of Kuwait may be the global community's most
ambitious undertaking in international claims settlement. The
number and dollar amount of claims before the UNCC,1 and the
complex legal issues they present, dwarf those of any previous
international arbitrations or claims settlements.2 Observers
estimate that more than 100 states will file over two million claims
totalling over $200 billion.3 Kuwaiti claims alone are approaching
$100 billion.4
1. As of November 1994, 94 governments filed 2.6 million claims with the UNCC
with an asserted value of $162 billion. Eric Schmitt, Righting Wrongs of War: Billions in
Claims Against Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at B9. See also Remarks by the Secretary-
General to the special meeting of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensa-
tion Commission on 14 January 1994 in Geneva, in Letter Dated 17 January 1994 from the
President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Compensation Commission, U.N.
Doc. S/1994/107, Annex, at 3 (1994) (English version).
2. Richard B. Lillich, Remarks, in Claims Against Iraq: The U.N. Compensation
Commission and Other Remedies, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 477, 477 (1992)
[hereinafter The UNCC and Other Remedies]; David J. Bederman, The United Nations
Compensation Commission and the Tradition of International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 3 (1994); Bachir Georges Affaki, La Commission d'indemnisation des
Nations Unies: Trois ans d'9preuve au service du reglement des diffdrends internationaux,
20 DROIT Er PRACIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 471, 471 (1994).
3. As of November 1, 1994, 82 states filed 907,357 "A" claims totaling $3.5 billion;
47 states filed 5,703 "B" claims totaling $18.9 million; 87 states filed 1,573,009 "C" claims
totaling $4.2 billion; 52 states and international organizations filed 9,377 "D" claims; 64
states filed 7,175 "E" claims; and 42 states and international organizations friled 214 "F"
claims. Ronald J. Bettauer, The United Nations Compensation Commission-Developments
Since October 1992, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 n.3 (1995); Markham Ball, U.N. Claims
Process: Steps Taken to Date; Issues to Resolve, MIDDLE E. EXECLtMVE REP., Oct. 1992,
at 9 [hereinafter Ball, U.N. Claims Process]; Markham Ball, The Iraq Claims Process-A
Progress Report, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 37, 37 (1992). See infra Part III.D. for an explanation of
the types of claims. See also Kuwaiti Claims Against Iraq Reach $4.1 Billion, Reuter
Newswire, Aug. 31, 1993, available in WL, INT-NEWS-C Database.
4. William Maclean, Kuwait Plans More Claims On Iraq, Reuters World Service,
June 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. U.S. claims exceed $1.7
billion. The United States filed: 3,100 individual ("A" through "D") claims with an
asserted value of approximately $215 million; 144 corporate ("E") claims with an asserted
value of approximately $1.5 billion; and five governmental ("F") claims with an asserted
value of approximately $17 million. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417 n.4.
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Critics argue that the entire endeavor is doomed because
there are insufficient funds to recompense the victims.5 They
further contend that the creation of the UNCC violates the
principle of sovereign equality of states.6 Iraq has never agreed
to the process,7 and the United Nations Security Council
("UNSC") "is imposing the claims process on Iraq, a defeated
nation. ' Victors' justice, critics contend, is no justice at all. 9
This Comment analyzes the Iraq claims process and proposes
possible solutions to the current impediments. Part II describes
Iraq's international responsibility. Part III explains the funding
mechanism, development, structure, and function of the UNCC.
Part IV presents the international legal precedents that the UNCC
has established. Part V outlines remedies in the United States for
domestic claimants. Part VI analyzes the impediments to the Iraq
claims process, and Part VII proposes possible solutions to these
impediments. Finally, Part VIII concludes that the precedents that
the UNCC has established and its recent first payment of compen-
sation awards bode well for continued success, but recognizes that
the entire Iraq claims process still may be in jeopardy. If Iraq
does not comply, or is not made to comply, with the UNSC
resolutions-a requirement for the lifting of UNSC sanc-
tions-most claimants against Iraq will receive little or no
compensation.
5. Donald E. deKieffer, Iraqi Reparations Machine: Why It Won't Work, What
Claimants Can Do, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Oct. 1991, at 8; Charles N. Brower,
Lessons to be Drawn from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 51, 57 (1992)
(asserting that "[tlhere will never, by any projection that anyone has seen, be enough
money to pay 100 per cent of the claims" before the UNCC).
6. "The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine
of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states having
uniform legal personality." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
287 (4th ed. 1990).
7. Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks, in Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Advantage, 88
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 521,521 (1994) [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity]. The UNCC
is "disturbing" because "Iraq never has had her day in court ...." Id.
8. Ken Myers, Gulf War Continuing for U.S. Lawyers, Attorneys Battle Iraq in
Courtrooms over Billions in Invasion-Related Damages, NAT'L LJ., June 20, 1994, at Al,
A17.
9. Bederman, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that the UNCC is a retributive instrument
of international power that has coercive, unilateral, and fundamentally inequitable features,
much like the reparations structures employed after the First and Second World Wars).
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II. IRAQ'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared it Iraq's
nineteenth province. The UNSC condemned Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait 1" and imposed sanctions against Iraq." Iraq's violation
of Kuwait's territorial sovereignty engaged Iraq's international
responsibility.12 This invasion led to the Persian Gulf War, which
began on January 16, 1991.
Before the cease-fire of April 3, 1991,13 the UNSC, acting
under its Chapter VII powers, 4 planted the legal seeds for
holding Iraq liable for its unlawful acts of aggression" against
Kuwait, and for all illegal acts committed during the Persian Gulf
War. On October 29, 1990, the UNSC informed Iraq that "under
international law [Iraqi is liable for any loss, damage or injury
arising in regard to Kuwait and third [party] states, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal
occupation of Kuwait.' 16 On March 2, 1991, the UNSC reiterated
its pronouncement that Iraq must "accept in principle its liability
under international law."' 7
10. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990).
11. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg. 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990).
12. This is true under international law as well as under Islamic law (Shari'a). "Iraq's
unprovoked aggression against a neighboring Muslim country is considered an act of
forceful usurpation (istila ) of property and an act of governmental tyranny (istibdad) over
peaceful inhabitants." Kamal Hussain Shukri, Available Defenses For Contracting Parties
Affected by the War, MIDDLE E. EXECUTrIVE REP., Oct. 1991, at 14, 15.
13. See generally Adam A. Levy, The Persian Gulf War Cease Fire-Agreement
Compared with the Japanese Peace Treaty in Terms of Reparations and Reconstruction, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L 541 (1992).
14. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter discusses "action with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
15. Following the June 7, 1981 Israeli bombing of a nuclear reactor near Baghdad,
Iraq insisted that the UNSC resolution condemning the act employ the term "aggression"
because it had "legal consequences, both in terms of retribution and compensation." Allan
Gerson, Remarks, in Sovereign Immunity, supra note 7, at 525,525. See generally Anthony
D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L 584 (1983);
United Nations: Consideration of the Military Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center
and IAEA Safeguards Regime, 20 IL.M. 963 (1981).
16. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1561 (1990).
17. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg. I 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 567 (1991).
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On January 12, 1991, after the U.S. Congress authorized
Operation Desert Storm,18 President George Bush maintained
that Iraq was responsible for reparations and compensation. 9 At
a news conference, President Bush stated, in regard to the UNSC
resolutions, "One of them relates to reparations, and reparations
is a very important part of this. It is a very important part of what
the United Nations has done."'  On February 19, 1991, President
Bush also rejected a Soviet peace initiative to end the Persian Gulf
War because, inter alia, the initiative failed to recognize Iraq's
international responsibility to pay compensation.21
In the Persian Gulf War "cease-fire" resolution of April 3,
1991, the UNSC stated that Iraq "is liable under international law
for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and
the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign govern-
ments, nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait."'  Having lost the Persian
Gulf War, Iraq was, according to one commentator, "at the mercy
of the United Nations, which has taken unto itself a right to a
perpetual stranglehold on the Iraqi economy."'  The "cease-fire"
resolution created the UNCC to administer a compensation fund
to settle claims against Iraq24 and maintain UNSC sanctions.
2
The UNSC adopted an operating scheme for the UNCC in a
18. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-
1, 105 Stat. 3 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1995)).
19. Stanley J. Glod, International Claims Arising from Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 25
INT'L LAw. 713, 714 (1991).
20. The President's News Conference, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 39,41 (Jan. 12,
1991).
21. Glod, supra note 19, at 720.
22. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847, 852 (1991). Iraq accepted the terms of the cease-fire
resolution in a letter to the UNSC dated April 6, 1991, stating it had "no choice but to
accept." Identical Letters Dated 6 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations Addressed to Respectively to the Secretary-General and the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22456, Annex, at 7 (1991)
(English version). The President of the UNSC acknowledged that Iraq had accepted the
cease-fire resolution "without qualifying conditions." Letter Dated 11 April 1991 from the
President of the Security Council Addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22485 (1991).
23. Brower, supra note 5, at 52.
24. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 22, 1 18.
25. Id. 1 22.
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subsequent resolution on May 20, 1991.26 Iraq immediately
denounced the UNCC as "totally illegal."27
III. STRUCTURE AND CLAIMS PROCESS OF THE UNCC
The UNCC is neither a court nor a tribunal; it is a "fact-
finding"'  organ of the UNSC. Its mission is golitica 29 or ad-
ministrative, rather than judicial or adjudicatory In this regard,
it differs significantly from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal estab-
lished by the Algiers Accords of 1980.31 U.S. opposition to any
sort of arbitration scheme influenced the UNSC's choice of a
political body over a judicial body.32 From its ten years of
experience with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the United States
apparently learned that conventional arbitration is quite slow, and
it successfully lobbied for the establishment of a UNSC-controlled
political body." The UNSC limited Iraq's role to presenting its
views to the UNCC's Panels of Commissioners' and receiving
26. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2987th mtg. 11 3-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991). This resolution substantially approved the
Secretary-General's recommendations. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/22559 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Report].
27. Afsane Bassir, Un fonds de compensation cr& par I'ONU; L'Irak devra indemniser
les victimes de la guerre du Golfe, LE MONDE (Paris), May 22, 1991, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Monde File. Mr. Abdulamir Al Anbari, Iraq's ambassador to the U.N.,
described the UNSC's creation of the UNCC as dictatorial and stated that nothing in the
U.N. Charter allows the UNSC to enact such draconian measures. Id.
28. 1991 Report, supra note 26, '1 20.
29. Brower, supra note 5, at 58.
30. Bachir Georges Affaki, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Era
in Claims Settlements?, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 21, 23 n.7 (1993). But see Higgins, supra note 7,
at 521; Gerson, supra note 15, at 525 (asserting that the Iraq claims process may represent
the UNSC's assumption of quasi-judicial powers).
31. Algiers Accords, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981). The Algiers Accords consists
of three documents: the "General Declaration," the "Claims Settlement Declaration," and
the "Undertakings," which entered into force on January 19, 1981. Id. The United States
and Iran concluded the Algiers Accords to settle the hostage crisis and claims arising from
the Iranian Revolution. Id
32. Affaki, supra note 30, at 24 n.13.
33. The UNCC "plan roughly follows U.S. wishes." Amy Stevens & Ellen J. Pollack,
U.N. Secretary General Proposes Panel to Sort Out Claims on Iraq, WALL ST. J., May 13,
1991, at B5.
34. Iraq recently boycotted a meeting at which a UNCC panel reviewed claims that
Iraqi banks seized Egyptian guest workers' savings totaling $500 million. Robert Evans,
Iraq Snubs U.N. Gulf War Commission, Reuters World Service, Apr. 18, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Iraq protested that the UNCC does not have
jurisdiction over this issue, and submitted its views in writing. Id. See infra notes 76-80
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information regarding all claims before the UNCC.35 The United
States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia raised $57 million in seed money
in 1991 to establish the UNCC.36
Because the UNSC created the UNCC as a political body, the
UNCC operates relatively "swiftly and effectively., 37 The UNSC,
however, could eliminate the UNCC or reduce its mission at any
time, if political will changed.38 If the five permanent members,
plus four other members of the UNSC, so voted,39 the UNCC
would cease to exist.
This potential for discontinuation could prove to be one of the
UNCC's greatest weaknesses. Dissolving the UNCC would not
only dash the hopes of many seeking compensation, but it would
also frustrate the international community's endeavor to establish
an important international legal precedent. Short of dismantling
the UNCC, the UNSC might cut back Iraq's contribution to the
compensation fund for political reasons. As one observer
remarked, "If the government changes in Iraq to one regarded as
favorable, the atmosphere may change and the percentage of
contribution from Iraqi oil exports may be reduced."'  Such a
reduction might threaten the UNCC's overall effectiveness.
Another observer predicted that if a new, more acceptable Iraqi
government comes to power before Iraq pays all the compensation
due, "there will be an immediate plea to remove this tremendous
burden from the Iraqi people."41
Many members of the international community would like to
see a change in Iraq's government or even the partition of Iraq
and accompanying text (discussing the UNCC's Panels of Commissioners).
35. 1991 Report, supra note 26. See Iraq-Kuwait Situation, 1992 U.N.Y.B. 275, 318,
U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.1 (discussing Iraq's criticism of the UNCC's alleged failure to
provide Iraq with adequate explanations of its decisions).
36. Schmitt, supra note 1, at B9.
37. Charles N. Brower, U.N. Claims Process Off to a Good Start Commission Is
Applying Lessons of U.S. Experience with Iran on Claims Tribunal, MIDDLE E.
EXECUTIVE REP., Oct. 1991, at 9, 11 [hereinafter Brower, Good Start]. See generally
Charles N. Brower, The United Nations Sets the Stage for Gulf War Compensation Claims,
8 J. INT'L ARB. 7 (1991).
38. Interview with Mr. John R. Crook, Counselor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission,
Geneva, Switz. (June 16, 1993).
39. Article 27 of the U.N. Charter governs UNSC voting. U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
40. Ronald J. Bettauer, Remarks, in The UNCC and Other Remedies, supra note 2, at
482,487.
41. Nicolas C. Ulmer, The Gulf War Claims Institution, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 85,92 (1993).
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into several smaller states, including a Kurdish one.42 A new
Iraqi government or subsequent successor state, however, still
would be responsible for paying the claims against Iraq under
international law.43 Nevertheless, the UNSC, in a political
decision, might halt the payment of these claims through the
UNCC.
A. Funding Mechanism
On August 15, 1991, following the Persian Gulf War, the
UNSC unanimously fixed the share of Iraqi oil proceeds to support
the compensation fund and the UNCC. 4 The UNSC adopted the
United Nations ("U.N.") Secretary-General's May 31, 1991 recom-
mendation to dedicate "30 percent of the annual value of the
exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq"'45 to
fund the compensation process. The UNSC arrived at the figure
of thirty percent because that represented Iraq's estimated military
expenditures before the Persian Gulf War.46  One observer
termed this funding mechanism a "reparations royalty., 47  The
U.N. Secretary-General recommended, and the UNSC approved,
the division of the remaining seventy percent of Iraq's oil revenues
between "normal imports" and "debt repayment," receiving forty-
eight percent and twenty-two percent, respectively."
42. R. Jeffrey Smith & John M. Goshko, U.S. Weighs More Aggressive Campaign to
Topple Iraqi Leader, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1991, at Al.
43. "When a state succeeds another state with respect to particular territory, the
capacities, rights and duties of the predecessor state with respect to that territory terminate
and are assumed by the successor state...." THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD),
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 208 (1986).
44. S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/705
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1715 (1991).
45. Letter Dated 30 May 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22661, Annex, 1 7 (1991)
[hereinafter S.G. Letter]; Charles N. Brower, International Law: Credibility Depends on
Iraqi Reparations, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., May 1992, at 12, 13 n.3. Iraq sits "atop
the world's second-largest reserves of oil and natural gas." Scott Kraft, Iraq's Teflon
Dictator, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1995, at Al.
46. 1991 Report, supra note 26, 13 (in determining the appropriate level of
compensation, the UNCC Governing Council should consider "the amounts of military
spending and arms imports in the past."); Bassir, supra note 27.
47. Brower, Good Start, supra note 37, at 10. See also Charles Brower, United Nations
Commission Applies the Lessons of Iran to Iraq, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 12, 1991, at
33.
48. Brower, supra note 45, at 13 n.3; S.G. Letter, supra note 45, 7.
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In March 1995, Argentina, the United States, and the United
Kingdom proposed a UNSC resolution that also earmarked thirty
percent of Iraqi oil sales for the compensation fund,49 but allocat-
ed the remaining seventy percent differently.5" Of the remaining
seventy percent of oil revenues, the resolution allocated twenty
percent for "U.N. humanitarian work with Iraqi Kurds"'51 and
fifty percent for "food and medicine. ' 5 2 Though this scheme does
not devote funds to the repayment of Iraqi debt, the resolution
expressly states that Iraq still must adhere scrupulously to its
obligations to service and repay its foreign debt.53 This new plan
would allow Iraq to sell $1 billion worth of oil every ninety days,
subject to periodic UNSC review.' The UNSC unanimously
adopted this resolution on April 14, 1995."5 Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz criticized this resolution when the UNSC
proposed it56 and after the UNSC adopted it, but he was "not
dismissive., 57 Iraq, despite its international responsibility, has not
yet agreed to this new UNSC regime and may continue to "[hold]
out for a broader lifting of the oil restriction.5 8 Thus, the UNCC
retains the authority to garnish thirty percent of Iraqi oil sales for
compensation, but Iraq refuses to cooperate, and the UNSC
sanctions remain in place.
49. S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3519th mtg. I 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/986
(1995).
50. Barbara Crossette, Iraq Dismisses Limited Plan to Ease Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1995, at L2.
51. Polish Diplomat Urges Iraq to Free 2 Americans, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at A8
[hereinafter Polish]. This resolution would provide $150 million (or 15% of oil sales)
every 90 days to the U.N. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme for its work in the three
northern governates of Dihouk, Arbil, and Suleimaniyeh. S.C. Res. 986, supra note 49, 1
8(b).
52. Polish, supra note 51, at A8.
53. S.C. Res. 986, supra note 49, 17. Iraq's total foreign debt exceeds $70 billion,
all of it in arrears. International Country Risk Guide-Middle East & North Africa, Jan.
1, 1993, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database.
54. Crossette, supra note 50, at L2.
55. Barbara Crossette, UN Offers Iraq Easier Terms To Sell Oil for Relief Needs, INT'L
HERALD TRhI. (Paris), Apr. 15-16, 1995, at 1.
56. Crossette, supra note 50, at 1.2; Polish, supra note 51, at A8.
57. Crossette, supra note 55, at 1.
58. Id. Iraqi Health Minister Omid Medhad recently repeated Iraq's rejection of
UNSC Resolution 986, which authorized limited oil sales to earn money for humanitarian
supplies, because "it compromised Iraq's sovereignty." Iraq Rejects Offer of Limited Oil
Sales, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.), Oct. 5, 1995, at 8A, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database.
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B. Structure of the UNCC
The UNCC consists of several entities: the Governing Council,
the Committee on Administrative Matters, the Executive Secretary
and Secretariat, and Commissioners and Three-Commissioner
Panels. A description of how each entity functions follows.
1. Governing Council
The Governing Council is comprised of fifteen members, one
from each state represented on the UNSC. This means the
membership of the Governing Council changes in accordance with
the rotating membership of the non-permanent members of the
UNSC. 59  One observer labeled the Governing Council, "the
mini-Security Council."6 The Governing Council held its first
meeting in Geneva on July 23, 1991,61 and it has issued twenty-
three decisions.6
The Governing Council is responsible for (1) guiding the
compensation fund,6 and (2) establishing the procedure for
processing claims.' A decision of the Governing Council re-
59. Ten of the 15 members of the UNSC are non-permanent members. The U.N.
General Assembly elects the non-permanent members for two-year terms. U.N. CHARTER
art. 23.
60. Brower, supra note 5, at 57.
61. Affaki, supra note 2, at 472.
62. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417.
63. "The compensation fund, which will receive the oil sale proceeds and disburse
awards, will be administered by Rabobank, in Utrecht," the Netherlands. Jeffrey A.
Jannuzzo, Essential Oil to Ease Pain, THE TIMEs (London), Mar. 2, 1993, available in WL,
INT-NEWS-C Database.
64. Criteria for expedited processing of urgent claims [Decision 1], U.N. Compensation
Commission, 1st Sess., 10th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/22885, Annex 11 (1991), previously issued
as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1712 (1991) [hereinafter
Decision 1]; Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission during its third session, at the 18th meeting, held on 28 November 1991, as
revised at the 24th meeting held on 16 March 1992, Criteria for additional Categories of
Claims [Decision 7], U.N. Compensation Commission, 3rd Sess., 18th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/23765, Annex (1992), previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1. (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1045 (1992) [hereinafter Decision 7]; Decision taken by the
Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at the 27th meeting,
Sixth Session held on 26 June 1992, Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, [Decision 10],
U.N. Compensation Commission, 6th Sess., 27th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/24363, Annex 1 (1992),
previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1053 (1992)
[hereinafter Decision 10].
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quires nine votes,6 and no member enjoys veto power. Govern-
ing Council decisions are "final and are not subject to appeal or
review on procedural, substantive or other grounds."'
The United States has exercised a great deal of influence
because "almost all substantive decisions of the Governing Council
to date have been based on U.S. working papers."67 This proba-
bly represents an extension of the U.S. leadership in the alliance
against Iraq following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
2. Committee on Administrative Matters
In December 1992, the Governing Council created the
Committee on Administrative Matters ("CAM"), which is com-
posed of Geneva representatives (or their designees) of interested
member states of the Governing Council.' The CAM, chaired
by the President of the Governing Council, meets informally to
advise the Executive Secretary and Governing Council on the
annual budget and other administrative matters, and otherwise
functions similarly to a subcommittee. Because the compensation
fund, not U.N. members' assessments, finances the UNCC's
administrative budget, the UNCC needed to create the CAM. The
CAM performs the oversight functions that the U.N. Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
("ACABQ") carries out for assessment-funded U.N. organs.69
3. Executive Secretary and Secretariat
As the administering body of the UNCC, the Secretariat
provides technical support for handling the vast number of claims.
The Secretariat organizes the Governing Council's sessions and
advises both applicant governments and international organiza-
tions. The Secretariat also prepares the claims, views of govern-
65. One exception to the nine-vote rule requires that all fifteen members reach a
consensus on decisions regarding the method of ensuring that payments are made to the
fund. Affaki, supra note 30, at 22 n.5.
66. Decision 10, supra note 64, art. 40(4).
67. Bettauer, supra note 40, at 486.
68. Establishment of the UNCC Committee on Administrative Matters, Decision taken
by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at its 31st
meeting held in Geneva on 18 November 1992 [Decision 14], U.N. Compensation Commis-
sion, 8th Sess., 31st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25135, Annex I (1993), previously issued as U.N.
Doc. S/AC.26/1992/14 (1993), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 244 (1995).
69. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 420 n.21.
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ments, and other documents for the panels.' The Secretariat is
located in the Villa La Pelouse, behind the Palais des Nations U.N.
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.7 The Secretariat's appoint-
ed staffe also includes several members of the so-called "Hague
mafia,"'73 those persons who worked together at the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal.
The Governing Council appointed former Peruvian ambassa-
dor Carlos Alzamora as UNCC Executive Secretary.74 The
Executive Secretary administers the compensation fund "under the
policy guidance of the Governing Council."75
4. Commissioners and Three-Commissioner Panels
The Governing Council in 1993 appointed nine commissioners
to evaluate the first three categories of claims.76 The commission-
ers "have a claims' adjustment function," and are not arbitra-
tors.77 The Governing Council divided the nine commissioners
into three panels, each comprised of a chairperson and two other
commissioners." Each panel reviews one category of claims and
70. Id. at 418.
71. John R. Crook, Recent Developmen The United Nations Compensation
Commission-A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 144
(1993).
72. The secretariat staff includes: Michael F. Raboin (USA), Deputy Executive
Secretary; Felipe Paolillo, Deputy Executive Secretary; Norbert Wtlhler (Germany), Chief
of Legal Service; and Mojtaba Kazazi (Iran). Bettauer, supra note 40, at 483; Jeffrey A.
Jannuzzo, UN Clears Compensation for Gulf War Victims, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 12,
1994, available in WL, INT-NEWS-C Database.
73. Bettauer, supra note 40, at 483.
74. See generally Carlos Alzamora, Reflections on the United Nations Compensation
Commission, 9 ARB. INT'L 349 (1993).
75. Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission during its second session, at the 15th meeting, held on 18 October 1991,
Arrangements for Ensuring Payments to the Compensation Fund [Decision 61, U.N.
Compensation Commission, 2nd Sess., 15th mtg. 5, U.N. Doc. S/24589, Annex I, at 18
(1991), previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/6 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1032
(1992).
76. Letter Dated 6 April 1993 from the President of the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Compensation Commission, U.N. Doc. S/25717 (1993) (English version)
[hereinafter UNCC Letter].
77. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 91.
78. UNCC Letter, supra note 76, at 1. The "A" claims panel includes: Mr. Josd Marfa
Ruda (Argentina) (chairman), Mr. Kamal Hossain (Bangladesh), Mr. Matti Praavo
PellonpiUl (Finland). The "B" claims panel includes: Mr. Mohammed Bennouna (Moroc-
co) (chairman), Ms. Denise Bendschedler-Robert (Switzerland), Ms. Fang Ping (China).
The "C" claims panel includes: Mr. Yves L. Fortier (Canada) (chairman), Mr. Sergei
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issues reports to the Governing Council within 120 days, pursuant
to Article 37 of the UNCC's Provisional Rules.79 The Governing
Council plans to appoint commissioners to evaluate the remaining
three categories of claims in 1995.80 Presumably, the UNCC will
install new panels of commissioners by appointing nine new
commissioners or shuffling existing ones.
C. Processing of Claims
On July 25, 1991, the Governing Council issued Decision 1,
which provided the criteria for expedited processing of urgent
claims.8 In Decision 1, the Governing Council determined the
process under which the UNCC would handle claims and defined
the "A" through "C" categories of claims. On March 17, 1992, the
Governing Council issued the criteria for additional categories of
claims to define the "D" through "F" categories of claims.' The
final deadline for filing individual ("A," "B," "C," and "D") claims
was January 1, 1995. The Governing Council, however, has the
authority to accept late claims, 4 and it has exercised this power
routinely."5 The UNCC has not yet set the final deadlines for
late corporate and government ("E" and "F") claims.86
Nikolaevich Lebedev (Russia), Mr. Philip Amoah (Ghana). Id.
Mr. Ruda passed away on July 7, 1994. On August 12, 1994, the Governing Council
appointed Mr. Rafael Rivas-Posada to the "A" claims panel and promoted Mr. Hossain
to be chairman. Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners
Concerning the First Instalment of Claims for Departure from Iraq or Kuwait (Category
"A" Claims), U.N. Compensation Commission, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/2 (1994), reprinted
in 34 I.L.M. 305, 310 n.6 (1995) [hereinafter "A" Claims Report].
79. Decision 10, supra note 64, art. 6.
80. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 419.
81. Decision 1, supra note 64, 1 18. The UNCC accepts claims for death, personal
injury or other direct loss to individuals suffered as a result of:
(a) Military operations or threat of military action by either side during the
period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991;
(b) Departure from or inability to leave Iraq or Kuwait (or a decision not to
return) during that period;
(c) Actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government of Iraq or its
controlled entities during that period in connection with the invasion or
occupation;
(d) The breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq during that period; or
(e) Hostage-taking or other illegal detention.
Id.
82. Decision 7, supra note 64.
83. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 422.
84. Decision 10, supra note 64, art. 12(2).
85. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 422.
86. Id.
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The UNCC claims process vaguely resembles a default
proceeding in an arbitration; the commissioners play the role of
"devil's advocate and assess whether these claims are realistic or
inflated."'  Because of the great number of claims, the UNCC
has organized a mechanism to expedite the flow of compensation
to victims. It also has created forms and computer software for
each category of claims.' One observer termed the UNCC
mechanism "arbitrage par ordinateur," or computer arbitration.
Submissions must be in English.'
U.S. domestic law served as a model for the Iraq claims
process. The UNCC, in deciding how to handle the large numbers
of claims, "looked to U.S. mass tort claims administration which is
absolutely applicable."91  The UNCC is "using some of the
techniques and arts of sampling that were developed in those
[asbestos and Dalkon Shield] cases."'  The UNCC selected the
U.S. mass tort claims model because of its relative efficiency."
Others, however, have criticized the UNCC's processing of
claims. A representative of a large international accounting
firm9' submitting claims said, "The whole procedure is a clear
invitation for everyone to overstate the claim by as much as
possible."" This statement indicates that the vast number of
claims precludes the UNCC from scrutinizing each claim and
ferreting out those that are inflated or spurious. Furthermore,
critics assert that the claims forms are confusing and that the
UNCC has not set sufficiently clear guidelines.'
87. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 90. One observer likened the UNCC's processing of
claims to the quick settlement of insurance claims. Schmitt, supra note 1, at B9.
88. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 419.
89. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 88.
90. Each government must translate its submissions, though it need not translate
supporting documents for "A," "B," and "C" claims unless the UNCC so requests.
Decision 10, supra note 64, art. 7.
91. Myers, supra note 8, at A17.
92. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 88. See Bettauer, supra note 3, at 418-19. University of
Alabama Law School professor Francis E. McGovern helped the UNCC erect a legal
framework based on U.S. mass tort law. Schmitt, supra note 1, at B9.
93. The UNCC hopes the mass tort claims model will be more efficient in handling
millions of claims than arbitration. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has employed
arbitration and settled only about 4,000 claims in over ten years. Steven Mufson, The
Long Quest for Iraqi Compensation, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1991, at H7.
94. The firm is Touche Ross. David Bowen, UK Firms Losing Out on Gulf Claims,
THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 28, 1992, at 21.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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D. Types of Claims
The UNCC framework provides six categories of claims: "A"
through "E" Claimants submit their claims forms to their govern-
ments,97 which in turn forward the claims to the UNCC. For
several categories of claims, the UNCC will compensate victims for
mental pain and anguish. The UNCC will grant interest on the
principal amount of the awards.
1. "A" Claims: Departure Claims
"A" claims are for individuals who were forced to depart
Kuwait or Iraq as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. A claimant may request a fixed lump sum of $2,500, with
a limit of $5,000 per family." Claimants also may request higher
amounts,' $4,000 and $8,000, respectively, but they must
waive1" all other claims before the UNCC. 01 The "A" claim
form is relatively simple and consists of only three pages. As of
November 1994, eighty-two states submitted 907,357 "A" claims
with an asserted value of $3.5 billion."° The total number of
"A" claims may exceed one million.l0
On September 15, 1994, the "A" claims Panel of Commission-
ers recommended to the Governing Council the payment of 53,845
claims submitted by sixty countries and the United Nations
97. U.S. claimants must fill out a claim form and return it to the Office of the
Assistant Legal Advisor for International Claims and Investment Disputes, Department
of State. 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 2 (Jan. 6, 1992); 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 530 (June 29,
1992); Marian Nash, Claims Against Iraq: United Nations Compensation Commission, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 346 (1992).
98. Decision 1, supra note 64, l 11, 14.
99. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and other Asian states viewed
the lower amounts as "insufficient in relation to the damages typically suffered by their
nationals." Crook, supra note 71, at 152. The Governing Council increased the amounts
in "a subsequent action supplementing Decision 1." Id.
100. The UNCC required less evidence and processed "A" claims faster than other
claims. This "waiver" created an incentive for claimants to "cash out" of the claims
process and reduced the burden on the UNCC. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 422.
101. Multi-Category Claims, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United
Nations Compensation Commission at its 46th meeting, held on 20 October 1994 in Geneva
[Decision 21], U.N. Compensation Commission, 46th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.21
(1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 256 (1995) [hereinafter Decision 21].
102. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417 n.3.
103. Affaki, supra note 30, at 26.
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Development Program ("UNDP").1' The "A" claims Panel
recommended compensation totalling over $185 million."t
Although the Governing Council approved the "A" claims Panel's
recommendation, 6 it can only make payments "when funds
become available."'" The funding mechanism of the UNCC
may prove to be inadequate to compensate departees. In fact, in
1994, the UNCC "conceded it does not have [on] hand the 200
million dollars in estimated payments needed to compensate
victims in category A.""'° This illustrates the present weakness
of the UNCC's funding mechanism.
Iraq facilitated the verification of "A" claims by submitting to
the UNCC its records of foreign workers and departures through
its borders.1°9 This cooperation came as a surprise to some
observers."' Though Iraq presently remains resistant to the
entire UNCC process, Iraq's submission of departure records
should work to its advantage by impugning unsubstantiated claims.
Iraq's cooperation only reflects a desire to limit its liability. The
international community should not construe Iraq's actions as
acquiescence to a process that it considers a violation of its
sovereign equality under international law.
2. "B" Claims: Serious Personal Injury or Death
Individuals who suffered serious personal injury or whose
spouse, child, or parent died as a result of Iraq's invasion and
occupation of Kuwait may file "B" claims for $2,500, with a
104. "A" Claims Report, supra note 78, at 343. See infra note 201 and accompanying
text (discussing the claims that the UNDP brought).
105. "A" Claims Report, supra note 78, at 343.
106. Decision Concerning the First Instalment of Claims for Departure from Iraq or
Kuwait (Category "A" Claims) taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission at its 46th meeting, held on 20 October 1994 in Geneva
[Decision 22], U.N. Compensation Commission, 46th mtg. '11, U.N. Doc. SIAC.26fDec.22
(1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 258 (1995) [hereinafter Decision 22]. At its 17th session, on
May 17,1995, the Governing Council approved payment for 132,000 additional "A" claims.
U.N. Body Approves More Gulf War Claims, United Press International, May 17, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News library, Wires File. This raises the total number of approved
"A" claims to 350,000 with a total asserted value of $875 million. Id.
107. Decision 22, supra note 106, '1 3.
108. U.N. Compensates First Victims of Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Agence France Presse,
June 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
109. Jannuzzo, supra note 63.
110. Id.
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$10,000 maximum per family."' Members of the allied coalition
armed forces, or their survivors, generally are not eligible for
compensation." 2 The approximately 2,400 survivors and mem-
bers of the U.S. armed forces who were killed or injured, there-
fore, must pursue other remedies,"' such as bringing suits in
national courts.1 4  As of November 1994, forty-seven states
submitted 5,703 "B" claims with an asserted value of $18.9
million. 5
The UNCC gave "B" claims priority'16 over all other claims
for "humane" purposes. 7 This prioritization is the opposite
approach to that taken by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which
"paid banks and corporations first, and then considered the claims
of individuals.""'  The UNCC is "processing claims of individu-
als first, then working its way up the scale. t1 9 On May 26, 1994,
the Governing Council approved the payments of 670 "B"
claims. 120 The UNCC transferred funds to governments on June
111. Bettauer, supra note 40, at 484.
112. Members of the armed forces of the allied coalition are only eligible for
compensation under the existing UNCC framework if they were mistreated as prisoners
of war. Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission at its Sixth session, 27th meeting held on 26 June 1992, Eligibility for
Compensation of Members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces [Decision 11], U.N.
Compensation Commission, 6th Sess., 27th mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/24363, Annex 11 (1992),
previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/11 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1067 (1992)
[hereinafter Decision 11].
113. Hearing of the International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject" Iraq Claims Legislation,
Federal News Service Washington Package, Sept. 21, 1994, at 21, available in WL,
ALLNEWS Database [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Richard Newcomb, Director,
Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of Treasury).
114. See infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing domestic remedies available
in the United States).
115. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417 n.3.
116. "Claimants with claims in the three categories of urgent claims (categories "A",
"B" and "C") shall receive priority treatment, including at both the processing and
payment stages." Priority of Payment and Payment Mechanism, Guiding Principles,
Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission
at its 41st meeting, held at Geneva on 23 March 1994 [Decision 17], U.N. Compensation
Commission, 41st mtg. 'I 1(b), U.N. Doc. S/1994/409, Annex I (1994), previously issued as
U.N. Doc. SIAC.26lDec.17 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 250 (1995) [hereinafter Decision
17]. See infra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing this prioritization).
117. Jannuzzo, supra note 63.
118. Myers, supra note 8, at A17.
119. Id
120. Decision Concerning the First Instalment of Claims for Serious Personal Injury or
Death (Category "B" Claims) taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 17:973
8, 1994, to pay these awards.121  After "B" claims (serious
personal injury or death), "[t]he next batch of claims will be paid
to departees ["A" claims] and individuals with losses under
$100,000 ["C" claims]."' In July 1995, however, the Governing
Council decided that it could not pay the second installment of
"B" claims, which totaled $875 million.
123
3. "C" Claims: Damages Up To $100,000
Individuals who suffered losses, or their survivors, may file for
amounts up to $100,000 under the "C" claims category. "C"
claims cover death, personal injury, or actual loss, and require
"appropriate evidence." 24 The "C" claim form is more complex
than the "A" or "B" claim forms and consists of twelve pages. As
of November 1994, eighty-seven states filed 1,573,009 "C" claims
with an asserted value of $4.2 billion."z
"C" claims differ from "B" claims in several ways. First, "C"
claims, in addition to death and personal injury, cover actual
losses, or losses of property and other interests." Second, the
amount of the award is much greater: $2,500 per person is the
maximum for "B" claims, whereas "C" claims may reach $100,000.
In processing "A" and "C" claims, the respective Panels of
Commissioners observed that a number of claimants selecting the
higher amount on their "A" claims127 also had filed claims in
Compensation Commission at its 43rd meeting, held on 26 May 1994 in Geneva [Decision
20], U.N. Compensation Commission, 43rd mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.20 (1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 254 (1995) [hereinafter Decision 20]. See infra note 222 and
accompanying text (discussing recent awarding of "B" claims).
121. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 418.
122. Ellen J. Pollock, Outcome Uncertain for Companies with Claims Relating to Gulf
War, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1994, at B2.
123. Ma Xiaolin, Compensation Troublesome Issue Left Over by Gulf War, Xinhua
News Agency, July 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter
Ma].
124. Affaki, supra note 30, at 27.
125. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417 n.3.
126. "C" claims cover (1) damages arising from departure or inability to leave Iraq or
Kuwait, hostage-taking or other illegal detentions; (2) damages arising from personal
injury, including mental pain and anguish; (3) damages arising from the death of a spouse,
child, or parent; (4) personal property losses; (5) loss of bank accounts, stocks and other
securities; (6) loss of income, unpaid salaries or support; (7) real property losses; and (8)
individual business losses. Affaki, supra note 30, at 27. Accordingly, the UNCC created
sub-categories "Cl" through "C8." Affaki, supra note 2, at 479.
127. The higher amount for an "A" claim is $4,000 for individual claims or $8,000 for
family claims. Decision 21, supra note 101, at 1.
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category "C."''  The instructions on the "A" claim form, howev-
er, specify that claimants selecting a higher amount waive all
claims" 9 under any other claim category.13° To correct this
problem, the Governing Council decided that a claimant who
selects a higher amount under category "A" and also files a "B,"
"C," or "D" claim, "will be deemed to have selected the corre-
sponding lower amount" under category "A," and the UNCC will
regularly process his other claim.
131
On March 17, 1992, the Governing Council issued the criteria
for additional categories of claims"' to define "D," "E," and "F"
claims categories for losses that the original UNCC framework did
not address.
4. "D" Claims: Damages Above $100,000
Individuals who have losses over $100,000 may file "D"
claims. The UNCC will pay "D" claims after "A," "B," and "C"
claims,133 and "D" claims "are available with respect to individu-
als who claim losses in excess of those compensable under claim
forms B or C."' As of November 1994, fifty-two states and
international organizations filed 9,377 "D" claims.'35 The U.S.
government has filed 3,000 individual claims ("A" through "D"
claims), with a total asserted value of over $205 million, on behalf
of its citizens.
136
5. "E" Claims: Corporate and Other Entities
The UNCC permitted corporations and other entities to file
"E" claims until July 1, 1994.137 The UNCC, however, has not
yet set a "final deadline" for the acceptance of late corporate
128. Id.
129. See supra note 100 (discussing the "A" claim waiver).
130. Decision 21, supra note 101, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Decision 7, supra note 64, at 1.
133. See Decision 17, supra note 116, 1(b).
134. Decision 7, supra note 64, 7.
135. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417 n.3.
136. Letter from President [Bill] Clinton in Report to Congress on Iraqi Compliance with
UN Security [Council] Resolution[s], U.S. Newswire, June 7, 1994, available in WL,
ALLNEWS Database [hereinafter Clinton Letter].
137. Bhushan Bahree, Gulf War Claims Against Iraq Top $100 Billion, With Deadlines
Nearing, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1994, at A13.
1995]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
claims.138  Compensation for corporations represents an innova-
tion in international law as "[h]istorically, commercial claims have
not been compensable after war."'39 Contracts with Iraq may be
the bases of claims against Iraq, but Iraq may not invoke force
majeure clauses"4 in these contracts as a defense.
141
States consolidate and present corporate "E" claims, which
must include proof of incorporation or registration in that
state.142 As of November 1994, sixty-four states filed a total of
7,175 corporate claims.143 As of June 1994, when the UNCC had
received about sixty percent of these corporate claims, the total
asserted value of "E" claims was $37 billion.'" Currently, the
total asserted value of "E" claims should exceed $50 billion. 45
The United States fied fifty corporate claims with an asserted
value of about $1 billion, and it currently is reviewing another one
hundred corporate claims totaling $600,000.146
6. "F" Claims: Governments and International Organizations
Governments 47 and international organizations may file "F"
claims. Though the deadline for filing "F" claims was August 1,
1994,'" the UNCC has not yet fixed a "final deadline" for late
submissions. 49 A conservative estimate suggests that "F" claims
138. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 422.
139. Colin MacKinnon, Business Claims against Iraq: Decision Breaks New Ground,
MIDDLE E. ExEcurmvE REP., May 1992, at 9.
140. "Such clause is common in construction contracts to protect the parties in the
event that a part of the contract cannot be performed due to causes which are outside of
the control of the parties and could not be avoided by exercise of due care." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 645 (6th ed. 1990).
141. Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission during its resumed Fourth Session, at the 23rd meeting, held on 6th March
1992, Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business Losses: Types of
Damage and Their Valuation [Decision 91, U.N. Compensation Commission, 4th Sess., 23rd
mtg. l 9, U.N. Doc. S/24589, Annex I, at 25 (1992), previously issued as U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1992/9 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1037 (1992) [hereinafter Decision 91; Affaki,
supra note 30, at 29; Ulmer, supra note 41, at 90.
142. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 89.
143. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 417 n.3. See also Bhushan Bahree, U.N. Prepares to
Expedite Loss Claims Against Iraq, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 28, 1994, at 4.
144. Bahree, supra note 137, at A13.
145. Id.
146. Clinton Letter, supra note 136.
147. Approximately 214 government agencies and political subdivisions filed "F" claims.
Schmitt, supra note 1, at B9.
148. Bahree, supra note 137, at A13.
149. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 422.
992 [Vol. 17:973
The Iraq Claims Process
will exceed $50 billion.'" Several Kuwaiti ministries have filed
separate claims, and observers estimate that the claim of the
publicly owned Kuwait Petroleum Company alone will amount to
as much as $45 billion."' Iraqi sabotage destroyed "1 billion
barrels of oil-or 1% of Kuwait's total capacity.', 5 2  Another
large "F" claim is the Kuwaiti Investment Authority's $41 billion
claim for reconstruction costs and lost investment opportuni-
ties.
153
The UNSC cease-fire resolution provided for compensation
for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources."
"F" claims cover environmental claims. 55 Kuwait and other
states may file "F" claims as late February 1, 1997.156 Awarding
compensation for environmental damage and depletion of natural
resources represents another UNCC innovation. The duty to pay
compensation for environmental damage is a relatively new
international norm. Never before has a state paid compensation
for attacking another's natural resources.'57
7. Compensation for Mental Pain and Anguish
The UNCC also will accept claims for mental pain and
anguish. 15  The UNCC promulgated a schedule of payments for
150. Bahree, supra note 137, at A13.
151. Sheila Jones, Survey of Kuwait" Lots of Uncertainties-Compensation, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 26, 1992, at 5.
152. Scott Kraft, Detente With Iraq Could Spoil Oil Sales for Others, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
25, 1994, at H2.
153. Aisha Fares, Kuwait Claims Almost 100 Billion Dollars in War Damages, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, July 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
154. Iraq released between seven and nine million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCr OF THE PERSIAN
GULF WAR (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 612,636 (1992). Iraq destroyed or damaged 590
oil well heads and set 508 on fire. Id.
155. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 22, 1l 16. See Laura Edgerton, Eco-Terrorist Acts During
the Persian Gulf War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?, 22 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 151 (1992). Kuwaiti environmental claims cover five subjects: (1) health risk
assessment; (2) terrestrial ecosystem damage; (3) damage to underground water supplies;
(4) fisheries losses; and (5) damage to coastal areas. Ecology and Environment, Inc. Signs
$2.8 Million Contract With Kuwaiti Government, PR Newswire, June 3, 1994, available in
WL, INT-NEWS-C Database.
156. Affaki, supra note 2, at 485.
157. Id. at 485 n.43.
158. Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission during its second session, at its 15th meeting, held on 18 October 1991,
Personal Injury and Mental Pain and Anguish [Decision 3], U.N. Compensation
Commission, 2nd Sess., 15th mtg. 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/22885, Annex 111 (1991), previously
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mental pain and anguish for most situations in which individuals
suffered during the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.'59 For
example, for the death of a spouse, child, or parent, an individual
may claim a maximum of $15,000, and a family may claim a
maximum of $30,000.1" Victims of aggravated assault, sexual
assault, or torture may claim up to $5,000 per incident.61
8. Interest
The UNCC will award interest on the principal amount of
successful claims. Interest will accrue from the date the loss
occurred until the date of payment, and the UNCC will grant
interest after the principal amount of the award. 62 The Govern-
ing Council has deferred determining the rate of interest, but it
will select a rate of interest "sufficient to compensate successful
claimants for the loss of use of the principal amount."'6 The
Governing Council postponed setting a rate of interest because the
United States and other members of the Governing Council were
split as to whether interest should be imposed at all. 1" The
language agreed upon represents a compromise. 65
On February 12, 1993, Iraq protested the awarding of interest
because the cease-fire resolution" did not declare that Iraq had
issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/3 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1028 (1992); Decision
taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission during
its Fourth Session, at the 22nd meeting, held on 24 January 1992, Determination of Ceilings
for Compensation for Mental Pain and Anguish [Decision 8], U.N. Compensation
Commission, 4th Sess., 22nd mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. S/24589, Annex I, at 23 (1992), previously
issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.2611992/8 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1036 (1992) [hereinafter
Decision 8].
159. Decision 8, supra note 158, l 3.
160. Id.
161. Id. The UNCC also will award compensation for mental pain and anguish to
individuals for dismemberment, disfigurement, loss of use of a body part, being taken
hostage, being illegally detained, having a well-founded fear for one's life, and being
deprived of all economic resources such as to threaten one's survival. Id
162. Awards of Interest, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission at its 31st meeting, held in Geneva on 18 December 1992
[Decision 16], U.N. Compensation Commission, 8th Sess., 31st mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc.
S/25135, Annex 111 (1993), previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/ACI.6/199216 (1993),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 247 (1995).
163. Id.
164. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 420.
165. Id
166. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 22.
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an obligation to pay interest on compensation. 167 Furthermore,
Iraq asserted that the imposition of interest conflicted with
international legal principles. Iraq contended that awarding
interest went against "the trend followed in peace treaties after the
Second World War and with the principles of justice and fair-
ness."'
1
The significance of awarding interest grows each day because
the interest owed by Iraq accrues while the claims process remains
stalled by Iraq's refusal to comply with the UNSC resolutions. If
the Iraq claims process is delayed further, the interest due on
billions of dollars of claims may become the straw that breaks the
camel's back. This is particularly true if the existing funding
mechanism cannot adequately cover the principal amount of the
claims before the UNCC.
E. Payment of Claims
In paying claims, the UNCC disburses the funds to govern-
ments, which in turn compensate successful claimants directly.
Only governments and other selected international agencies can
file claims and distribute payments.1 69 As one observer described
the payment process, governments act as trustees to the claim-
ants.1 70 To assure that payments actually get to the claimants,
the Governing Council has required governments to establish
mechanisms for distributing payments "in a fair, efficient and
timely manner."' Generally, governments must distribute funds
to successful claimants within six months." Governments also
must report to the UNCC on the amounts of payments distribut-
167. Iraq-Kuwait Situation, 1993 U.N.Y.B. 426, U.N. Sales No. E.94.I.1.
168. It at 427.
169. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC") files claims for U.S.
claimants, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office files claims for United Kingdom
claimants, the Ministire des Affaires lttrang~res files claims for French claimants, and the
Public Authority for the Assessment of Compensation for Damages Resulting from Iraqi
Aggression ("PAAC") files claims for Kuwaiti claimants. Affaki, supra note 2, at 487.
170. Id. at 486 n.48.
171. Distribution of Payments and Transparency, Decision taken by the Governing
Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at its 41st meeting, held at Geneva
on 24 March 1994 [Decision 181, U.N. Compensation Commission, 41st mtg. 1 1, U.N.
Doc. S/1994/409, Annex 11 (1994), previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.18 (1994),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 252 (1995) [hereinafter Decision 18].
172. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 421.
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ed. 73 The Governing Council may suspend disbursements to
governments that fail to comply with the UNCC requirements. 4
To offset their costs, governments may deduct a processing fee
of up to one and one-half percent for "A," "B," and "C" claims
and three percent for "D," "E," and "F" claims' 75 The differ-
ence between the processing fees that the governments and other
selected international agencies may deduct on different categories
of claims reflects the UNCC's preference for individual claimants
over corporate and governmental claimants. The larger amounts
claimed under "D," "E," and "F" claims presumably only would
allow governments to justify deducting a smaller percentage as a
processing fee. The UNCC, however, favors reducing the
processing costs borne by individuals, who typically make relatively
smaller and less complicated claims. The UNCC has shifted these
processing costs to the corporate and larger claimants, those
arguably better able to bear them.
E Determining the Eligibility of Claims
One of the Panels of Commissioners evaluates each claim to
determine its eligibility to receive compensation under criteria
established by the Governing Council. The Panels of Commission-
ers issue reports and recommendations to the Governing Council,
which then makes the final decisions on the payment of awards.
The Governing Council has made several decisions regarding the
eligibility of certain claims.
1. Decision on Embargo-Related Claims
The Governing Council's decision on claims for losses related
to the embargo imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait
represents one of the most contentious developments to date. The
Governing Council decided 76 to exclude these sizable embargo-
related claims because they might "overwhelm the other
claims." 77 Critics, however, object to this decision on four
173. Decision 18, supra note 171, 1(d).
174. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 421.
175. Decision 18, supra note 171, 1 1(a).
176. In Decision 1, the Governing Council decided that "[clompensation will not be
provided for losses suffered as a result of the trade embargo and related measures."
Decision 1, supra note 64, 1 16.
177. Daniel B. Magraw, Claims Against Iraq, in The UNCC and Other Remedies, supra
note 2, at 487, 490.
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grounds.'78 First, the decision unfairly treats embargo-related
claims, which arose just as directly as did other legitimate
claims. 79 Second, the decision promotes an anti-business, pro-
individual policy. Third, the decision lets the costs of the embargo
remain where they fell. Fourth, the decision denies that embargo-
related claims are legitimately recoverable under international law
and that funding problems motivated the Governing Council's
decision.
A person with an embargo-related claim, however, is not
deprived entirely of means of compensation because he remains
"perfectly at liberty to take that claim elsewhere ' '""3 (i.e., to bring
it before a domestic legal system). Bringing a claim for embargo-
related losses in a U.S. court, however, may prove unsatisfactory
because of the lack of sufficient Iraqi assets to attach and satisfy
the claim.'
The Governing Council clarified its position on compensating
business losses resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait where the trade embargo was also a cause."' In such
situations, the loss is eligible for compensation if it was caused
directly by the invasion and occupation and would have been
suffered irrespective of the trade embargo." The Governing
Council maintained that businesses had a duty to mitigate
damages. Therefore, a loss caused solely by the trade embargo
and related measures is not eligible for compensation.1 4
178. Id.
179. But see Crook, supra note 71, at 154. The "decision not to compensate embargo
losses reflected a legal judgment that the causal link... was not sufficiently direct." Id.
180. Jeremy Carver, Discussion, in The UNCC and Other Remedies, supra note 2, at
494, 495.
181. See infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing domestic remedies).
182. Decision 9, supra note 141, '1 6; Compensation for Business Losses Resulting from
Iraq's Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait where the Trade Embargo and Related
Measures Were also a Cause, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United
Nations Compensation Commission at its 31st meeting, held in Geneva on 18 December
1992, [Decision 15], U.N. Compensation Commission, 8th Sess., 31st mtg. 9, U.N. Doc.
S/25135, Annex II (1993),previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC26/1992/15 (1993), reprinted
in 34 I.L.M. 244 (1995) [hereinafter Decision 15].
183. Decision 15, supra note 182, at 4.
184. Id. at 5.
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2. Decision on Military Costs
After a March 24, 1994 decision of the Governing Council,1"
the Chairman of the Governing Council, Fernando Valenzuela
Marzo (of Spain), and the UNCC's Executive Secretary, Carlos
Alzamora, "confirmed that the [Governing] [C]ouncil had ruled
that countries in the U.S.-led alliance that drove Iraqi forces out
of Kuwait will not be reimbursed for their military costs."1' 6
Though the costs of military operations implicitly were ineligible
under an earlier decision regarding individual members of the
allied forces,187 several states asked the UNCC for an explicit
ruling to settle the issue.188
Traditionally, reparations indirectly offset the victors' military
costs."l 9 The decision not to compensate military costs may
reflect the fact that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and non-combatant
states such as Japan 90 and Germany 91 made significant finan-
cial contributions to the U.S.-led Persian Gulf War effort.1 2  In
other words, combatant states, including the United States, did not
solely bear the costs of their Persian Gulf War military expendi-
tures, because donor states partially underwrote these costs. This
probably contributed to the Governing Council's decision to let
185. Military Costs, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission at its 41st meeting, held at Geneva on 24 March 1994 [Decision
19], U.N. Compensation Commission, 41st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1994/409, Annex III (1994),
previously issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26fDec.19 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 253 (1995).
186. Philippe Naughton, U.N. Says Iraq Will Have To Pump Oil In The End, Reuters
World Service, Mar. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
187. Decision 11, supra note 112, 1.
188. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 422.
189. See generally THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 (1986) (discussing the application of
reparations).
190. Japan Offers Refugee Planes, Funds, Facts On File World News Digest, Jan. 24,
1991, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database; Evelyn Iritani, Well Wishes From Alaska,
Lifting Export Ban Could Make Japan a Big Oil Customer, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at
D1.
191. Terence Roth, The Gulf War: Bonn Pledges More Funds To Pay for Gulf War
Effort, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 22, 1991, at 2.
192. Allied contributions to the Persian Gulf War effort included: $16.8 billion from
Saudi Arabia; $16 billion from Kuwait; $10.7 billion from Japan; $6.5 billion from
Germany; $3 billion from the United Arab Emirates; $300 million from South Korea; and
$3 million from other states. Paying the Costs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A10. Another
source estimates that military costs of the Persian Gulf War totaled $65 billion. Robin
Wright, Gulf War Victors, Losers No Longer Clear, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, at A9.
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members of the Persian Gulf War alliance bear their own
outstanding military costs.
IV. PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The UNCC, itself, represents an important precedent in
international law. The establishment of the UNCC follows a
remarkable occurrence in recent history-the nearly universal
condemnation of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
Several observers, however, believe that the UNCC merely follows
the traditions of the two-hundred-year history of international
claims settlement.' 93  Nevertheless, the UNCC is significant
because it represents the UNSC's first attempt to establish an
international claims settlement agency' 9' against a state, without
that state's complete capitulation.195
The UNCC must succeed in achieving its goals so that the
members of the international community will continue to establish
and fund effective international dispute resolution mechanisms,
especially those that remedy acts of aggressor states and threats to
peace and security9%
In addition to the innovation of establishing the UNCC, the
UNCC has created other precedents and practice that may
crystalize into new international law. The most noteworthy
examples include: the UNCC's treatment of residents, stateless
persons, and dual nationals; presumptions of state responsibility;
recent awards; prioritization of individual claims; and measures
preventing multiple recovery. At least one critic believes that
because the UNCC operates under UNSC resolutions, or a lex
specialis,19 its decisions and practice will lack precedential
193. Bederman, supra note 2, at 42; Elyse J. Garmise, The Iraqi Claims Process and the
Ghost of Versailles, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 840, 842 (1992). See also Levy, supra note 13, at
557.
194. Such a "multinational or international claims tribunal is without precedent." Glod,
supra note 19, at 719.
195. The UNSC's "action was historically unique in issuing what is tantamount to a
summary judgment holding Iraq responsible for a whole series of breaches of international
law." Id. at 715.
196. But see Higgins, supra note 7, at 521. Although the illegality of Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait was "apparent," many observers "have been rather disturbed by the United
Nations' [Security Council's] assumption of quasi-judicial powers even in the case of Iraq
where the facts were extraordinarily clear .... " Id
197. Lex specialis differs from public law in that the former is "designed for a particular
purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action or operation."
BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1398 (6th ed. 1990).
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value. 9 ' Should the UNSC create another international claims
settlement organization, however, such an organization would draw
upon UNCC precedent.
A. Claims of Residents, Stateless Persons, and Dual Nationals
The UNCC's innovations include its acceptance of claims by
governments on behalf of their residents as well as their nationals,
and its acceptance of claims brought by stateless persons. The
UNCC has left behind the formalities of classic diplomatic
espousal' 99 for a more flexible approach." This flexibility is
particularly important to stateless persons bringing claims. For
example, the UNDP may bring to the UNCC the claims of
Palestinians who reside in Israel."° The United Nations Relief
and Works Agency ("UNRWA") may bring the claims of Palestin-
ians who reside elsewhere in the Middle East.'
The UNCC's flexible approach to diplomatic espousal does
not go so far as to permit most Kurds to bring claims. One
criticism of the UNCC is that "Kurdish claims are not covered by
the system" 2 3 because the UNCC provides no remedy to Kurds
with exclusively Iraqi nationality. As the borders of Iraq stand
today, allowing Kurds of exclusively Iraqi nationality to bring
198. Bederman, supra note 2, at 39-40. But see BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 699-700
(asserting that the practice of political organs of international organizations may be
evidence of customary international law).
199. Diplomatic espousal refers to the bringing of a claim by a state on behalf of an
individual. A state may pursue a claim on behalf of an individual, usually its citizen,
against another state because the individual is not a subject of international law.
BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 581. The Permanent Court of International Justice defined
espousal as a state asserting its own right by "taking up the case of one of its nationals,
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf."
Bederman, supra note 2, at 25 n.114 (citing Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v.
Latvia), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76 (Feb. 28)).
200. Crook, supra note 71, at 149. The UNCC "has not altered the international law
of the state espousal of claims; it has only provided a fresh new model applied under...
twenty-first century concerns." Cannel Whelton, The United Nations Compensation
Commission and International Claims Law: A Fresh Approach, 25 OTTAWA L. REV. 607,
611 (1993).
201. Affaki, supra note 30, at 35. Of the "A" claims (for departure) which the UNDP
(Jerusalem Office) brought, the "A" claims Panel recommended that 59 receive
compensation totaling $286,500. "A" Claims Report, supra note 78, at 345.
202. Affaki, supra note 30, at 35. UNRWA did not bring any claims before the "A"
claims Panel. "A" Claims Report, supra note 78, at 345. Jordan brought most of the "A"
claims on behalf of Palestinians. Id at 330.
203. Ronald J. Bettauer, Discussion, in The UNCC and Other Remedies, supra note 2,
at 496, 498.
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claims against Iraq at the UNCC would violate traditional rules of
espousal. Nonetheless, some observers argue that the UNCC
should relax its rules' in light of the publicized plight of the
Kurdish people, the UNSC's creation of a no-fly zone in Northern
Iraq, and the wish of many Kurds for the reestablishment of a
Kurdish state.206
The issue of Kurdish claims relates to the more general
problem of claims of dual nationals under international law.
Claims of dual nationals proved to be a problem at the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal. Under traditional international law, "a State may
not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a
State whose nationality such person also possesses."2  This
doctrine left many dual nationals without a remedy. To solve this
problem, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal finally agreed on a rule
that defined the relevant nationality as the "dominant and
effective" one.2°8 This holding allows a dual American-Iranian
national of predominantly American nationality to make a claim
against Iran. The UNCC, in contrast, goes further and accepts the
claim of a dual national with dominant and effective Iraqi
nationality as long as he possesses a "bona fide nationality of any
other State."2 9 This represents another marked "departure from
204. D. Michael Hinkley, Discussion, in The UNCC and Other Remedies, supra note 2,
at 496, 496.
205. See generally Timothy P. McIlmail, No-Fly Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement
of Air Exclusion Regimes Over Bosnia and Iraq, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 35
(1994).
206. See James M. Dorsey, Tackling the Kurdish Issue, Turkey Should Consider Giving
Ethnic Group Autonomy, Some Say, CHI. TRIB. July 21, 1993, at 4; James M. Dorsey,
Giving Ground- Mideast Nations Feel Pressure to Give Kurds An Independent State Amid
Rising Violence, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 15, 1993, at 1, available in WL, ALLNEWS
Database. Kurdistan, an independent state, existed between 1920 and 1923. Gregory J.
Ewald, The Kurds' Right to Secede under International Law: Self-Determination Prevails
Over Political Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 375, 398 (1994).
207. Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
[signed at The Hague], Apr. 12, 1930, art. 4, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101. See also Iran-US. CL
Trib.: Decision in Case No. A118 Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of
Persons with Dual Nationality, 23 I.L.M. 489, 497 (1984).
208. See Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, 2 IRAN-U.S. CL. TREB. REP. 157, 161 (1984);
Golpira v. Iran, 2 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 171, 173 (1984).
209. Decision 1, supra note 64, 1 17. The first installment of "B" claims "contained no
claim submitted by an Iraqi national." Recommendations made by the Panel of
Commissioners Concerning Individual Claims for Serious Personal Injury or Death
(Category "B" Claims), U.N. Compensation Commission, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1,
Annex VI (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 263, 275 (1995) [hereinafter "B" Claims Report].
The first installment of "A" claims contained no claim submitted on behalf of an Iraqi
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conventional practice" ° by the UNCC. This liberal rule will
allow more individuals to seek compensation.
B. Presumption of State Responsibility
The presumption of the state responsibility of Iraq is another
UNCC innovation in international law. Under two UNSC resolu-
tions,"' the unlawfulness of Iraq's acts of aggression is the causal
factor of Iraq's responsibility. Therefore, attributing a wide array
of wrongful acts to Iraq appears very likely. In particular, the
UNCC will attribute to Iraq acts of persons acting in fact on behalf
of Iraq, or otherwise, because liability "exists even in cases where
the individual act of an Iraqi agent, taken in isolation, would not
constitute a violation of international law." ' The vast liability
of Iraq under the UNSC resolutions probably reflects its flagrantly
unlawful invasion of Kuwait and the fact that the UNSC-effectiv-
ely the leader of the victorious thirty-two-state allied coalition213
of the Persian Gulf War-established the UNCC.
Furthermore, in Decision 1, the UNCC ruled that Iraq is
responsible for "actions by officials, employees, or agents of the
government of Iraq or its controlled entities during that period in
connection with the invasion or occupation."2"4  Because this
decision does not mention de facto agents,1 ' it remains unclear
whether the UNCC will interpret the word "agent" in Decision 1
as encompassing persons acting in fact for Iraq. The use of the
subjective term "entities controlled," however, may indicate that
the UNCC will entertain the question of whether a person was
factually linked to Iraq, or provide a basis on which a claimant also
may argue that an offending person was an "entity controlled" by
Iraq. Iraq's international responsibility for all acts of persons
national. "A" Claims Report, supra note 78, at 320. The "A" claims Panel, however,
"foresees that future installments may contain a limited number of claims submitted on
behalf of Iraqi nationals." Id.
210. Crook, supra note 71, at 150.
211. S.C. Res. 674, supra note 16, [ 8; S.C. Res. 686, supra note 17, 2(b).
212. Crook, supra note 71, at 147.
213. Wright, supra note 192, at A9.
214. Decision 1, supra note 64, '1 18(c).
215. Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility defines acts of de facto agents as "acts of private persons in fact performing
public functions or in fact acting on behalf of the State." Roberto Ago, Special
Rapporteur, Third Report on State Responsibility, [1971] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 199, 267,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246.
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acting in fact on behalf of Iraq, or otherwise, establishes a
precedent in international law.
As in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the UNCC addresses
issues of persons fleeing,216 persons expelled, and the related
questions of attribution."" The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had
difficulty attributing to Iran the wrongful expulsions occurring
during its revolution.218 To overcome this legal obstacle, the
Governing Council adopted a conclusive presumption that Iraq's
unlawful invasion and occupation caused the mass departures."9
Thus, Iraq is irrebuttably responsible for the fleeing and expulsions
regardless of the status of the actor causing the persons to
leave.' This presumption also allows more than one million
individuals to make claims.
C. Recent Decisions Awarding "B" Claim Funds
The UNCC's recent decision awarding "B" claim funds to
survivors and those who suffered serious personal injury represents
another precedent. In May 1994, after the "B" claims Panel
reviewed 1,119 "B" claims,221 the Governing Council ap;
proved22 its recommendation to compensate 670 claimants'
in sixteen countries224 for a total of $2,747,500. 2  Kuwait re-
ceived the highest number of "B" claim awards, followed by
216. The "A" claims Panel estimated that there were approximately 2 million departees.
"A" Claims Report, supra note 78, at 329.
217. Iraq is responsible for the "departure from or inability to leave Iraq or Kuwait (or
a decision not to return)." Decision 1, supra note 64, 1 18(b). This represents the second
type of five "causes of loss" that the UNCC defined. Id
218. See Alfred L.W. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP.
76 (1988) (rejecting the establishment of a rebuttable presumption that Iran was
responsible for acts of persons who forced U.S. claimants to flee Iran); Ruth L. Cove, State
Responsibility for Constructive Wrongful Expulsion of Foreign Nationals, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 802, 809 (1988).
219. Crook, supra note 71, at 148.
220. Brower, supra note 5, at 56.
221. "B" Claims Report, supra note 209, at 304.
222. Decision 20, supra note 120, '1 2.
223. Kuwait Distributes Iraq Compensation, Reuters World Service, Aug. 2, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Kuwait Distributes].
224. The 670 successful "B" claimants came from: Australia, China, Slovak Republic,
France, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Mauritius, Pakistan, Poland, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
United Kingdom, United States, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). Decision 20, supra note 120, at 2.
225. Id.
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Jordan. 6 Ninety United Kingdom citizens were among the 670
claimants 227 receiving "B" awards, and the "B" claims Panel of
Commissioners recommended that eleven U.S. claimants receive
compensation.m
On August 2, 1994, two Kuwaiti ministries-the Finance
Ministry and the Public Authority for the Assessment of Compen-
sation for Damages Resulting from Iraqi Aggression
("PAAC")-distributed "B" claim awards totalling $1,397,500 to
303 persons.? 9 This represented the first payment of claims ever
made under the UNCC framework. The money for this payment
"represents the loan, made to the UN by the United States under
[UNSC] Resolution 778, of frozen [Iraqi] funds.""2  The UNCC
dramatically scheduled this historic event on the fourth anniversary
of Iraq's invasion. One Kuwaiti official stated that despite their
limited amount, the payments had "considerable symbolic
importance because they reinforced the principle of compensation
for acts of international aggression.""2
This recent disbursement of "B" claim awards has helped
rebutprevious criticisms that the UNCC never would achieve its
goals.2 Although those who suffered losses can only rarely be
made whole, claimants generally welcomed some compensa-
tion." This disbursement also provided great symbolic value
and reinforced the rule of international law. The payment of
compensation to those who suffered losses due to Iraq's invasion
and occupation of Kuwait reaffirmed the international
community's commitment to punish acts of international aggres-
sion.
The payment of the "next batch of individual claims [original-
ly expected in October 1994] . .. will require about $200 million
226. Kuwait Receives First Compensation Payment, ARAB TIMEs, June 17, 1994,
available in WL, INT-NEWS-C Database.
227. Gordon Martin, United Nations: Britons to Get Compensation for Gulf War, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 27, 1994, at 14, available in WL, INT-NEWS-C Database.
228. "B" Claims Report, supra note 209, Annex VI.
229. At Last... It's In The Bank, ARAB TMES, Aug. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US File.
230. Jannuzzo, supra note 72.
231. Kuwait Distributes, supra note 223.
232. See generally deKieffer, supra note 5, at 8.
233. But see "Human Shields" Say UN Compensation Too Little, Reuters World
Service, June 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
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that the compensation fund currently does not possess."234
Besides an infusion of capital from flushing Iraqi oil pipelines 5
and loans of frozen Iraqi assets from national governments,2
36
few, if any, other viable sources of short term funding exist to
replenish the UNCC's accounts. If the UNCC is to continue its
precedent of compensating claimants, the international community
must ensure that Iraq complies with its obligation to fund the
UNCC.
D. Prioritization of Individuals' Claims
The UNCC gives priority to claims of individuals. 7 Many
welcome this prioritization as a "democratic" innovation because
if states follow this practice in future international claims settle-
ment fora, the number of individual claimants will increase." s
An attorney representing the Kuwaiti government before the
UNCC, however, believes that this prioritization has turned the
process "on its head."29  As a practical matter, individuals file
relatively few claims in international claims fora because of the
prohibitive costs24  and burdens.24' This is unfortunate, as
individuals often suffer losses that are significant in relation to
their total financial worth. The UNCC's giving priority to
individual claims over corporate and governmental claims will aid
those traditionally deprived of just compensation.
A more cynical view sees this prioritization as a calculated
public relations gesture by the UNCC to ensure the payment of
234. Stephanie Nebehay, Kuwait Seeks $41 Billion in Claims Against Iraq, Reuter
Newswire, June 28, 1994, available in WL, INT-NEWS-C Database.
235. A potential one-time capital infusion that might help cover some of the UNCC's
present shortfall may come from the "sale of crude oil that is to be flushed from an Iraqi-
Turkish [Kirkuk to Yumurtalik] pipeline." U.N. Pays Victims of Iraqi Invasion, WASH.
POST, June 9, 1994, at A21.
236. See infra Part VII.D. (discussing lending frozen Iraqi assets to the UNCC).
237. Decision 17, supra note 116, 1(b).
238. Brower, supra note 5, at 55. The UNCC has overcome the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal's failure to give a remedy or some relief to "little people, the individuals." Id
239. Schmitt, supra note 1, at B9. Mr. Robert J. Dwyer, a lawyer at the firm of Bryan
Cave, complained that the prioritization of individual claims ignores Kuwait, "the principal
victim." Id. The United States initially opposed this prioritization. The United States
asserted that it was premature to pay any claims before better projections of UNCC
funding became available. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 421.
240. Claimants seldom receive compensation for lawyers' fees. This is also true under
the UNCC regime. Decision 1, supra note 64, 116.
241. Under international law, the state must espouse an individual's claim. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text.
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larger claims. That is, by publicizing the initial compensation of
individuals, the UNCC hopes to garner international support for
the claims process and ensure the eventual payment of the bulk of
the compensation to the larger claimants, namely corporations and
governments.242 A more likely explanation for the prioritization
of individual claims over those of larger claimants is the fact that
the individual claims are less complicated and for relatively small
amounts. This prioritization means that the UNCC will compen-
sate at least some claimants regardless of Iraq's cooperation.
E. Measures to Avoid Multiple Recovery
Measures to avoid multiple recovery represent another
innovation of the UNCC. Because claimants might simultaneously
seek compensation through both domestic courts (or other fora)
and the UNCC, the Governing Council adopted measures to
prevent claimants from recovering more than their actual damag-
es.243  To achieve this goal, the Governing Council solicits
information from Iraq and all governments about claims in
domestic courts that also might be eligible for compensation from
the UNCC.2 4 Based on this information, the UNCC may deduct
from its payment the amount awarded by any other court.24
The UNCC implemented these precautions against multiple
recovery to provide some degree of fairness to Iraq, which objects
to the entire process. The claims process under the UNCC is not
intended to be adversarial.' Only with the cooperation of
national governments will the UNCC prevent claimants from
taking more than their fair share from Iraq.
V. DoMEsTic REMEDIES
The U.N. policy on claims against Iraq makes clear that
"individual nations are free to go their own way in disbursing
242. One observer predicts that "politics and a lot of horse-trading" will influence the
prioritization of larger claims. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 92.
243. Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission at its 29th meeting held on 24 September 1992, Further Measures to Avoid
Multiple Recovery of Compensation by Claimants [Decision 13], U.N. Compensation
Commission, 7th Sess., 29th mtg. l 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/24611, Annex H (1992), previously
issued as U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/13 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1069 (1992) [hereinafter
Decision 13]. See also Decision 21, supra note 101.
244. Decision 13, supra note 243, Il 1-2.
245. Id. I 3(b).
246. Affaki, supra note 30, at 23.
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domestically frozen Iraqi assets to domestic claimants.""24 The
prospects of a claimant seeking recovery domestically, however,
are "dismal," 2 8 primarily because there are insufficient Iraqi
assets to attach and satisfy potential judgment
On August 2, 1990, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
President Bush, acting under the International Economic Emergen-
cy Powers Act,249 implemented Executive Order 12722, which
froze all Iraqi assets in the United States.' The Bush Adminis-
tration "recommend[ed] that courts not issue judgments giving
private claimants access to frozen Iraqi assets in the UnitedStates.""s
The U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control ("OFAC") carried out the Executive Order. OFAC and
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC") of the
Department of Justice monitor the status of frozen assets and the
cases of U.S. claimants.1 2  OFAC issued regulations implement-
ing the Executive Orders. 3  One regulation' requires that
"parties having a stake in property blocked by the Executive
247. State Department Stalls Private Suits Seeking to Recover Damages from Iraq, BNA
International Trade Daily, Aug. 7,1991, available in WL, BNA-BTD Database [hereinafter
State Department Stalls]. One observer, however, suggested that the world community
quickly "internationalize" frozen Iraqi assets for claims that the UNCC does not cover
before national claimants deplete such assets. Magraw, supra note 177, at 488. States
holding frozen Iraqi assets could contribute them to the UNCC or another international
administrative body to distribute on a world-wide, pro rata basis. Id.
248. Magraw, supra note 177, at 488.
249. 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (1995).
250. Exec. Order No. 12722, 3 C.F.R. 294 (1991), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp.
II 1988). President Bush issued a second more detailed Executive Order on August 9,
1990. Exec. Order No. 12724, 3 C.F.R. 297 (1991), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp.
II 1988). To protect Kuwaiti assets, on August 2, 1991, and August 9, 1991, President
Bush issued two Executive Orders blocking Kuwaiti government assets held in the United
States. Exec. Order No. 12723, 3 C.F.R. 296 (1991), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp.
II 1988); Exec. Order 12725, 3 C.F.R. 299 (1991), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. II
1988).
251. State Department Stalls, supra note 247.
252. See Glod, supra note 19, at 715-18. OFAC took a census of blocked Iraqi
government assets and a second census of domestic claims against Iraq. The submission
of an OFAC census form did not constitute a filing of a formal claim for compensation
with the U.S. government. OFAC noted, however, that the failure to file a form would
be "prejudicial to the interests of the claimant and other U.S. claimants." Id at 716.
253. Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 575 (1992).
254. 31 C.F.R. 33 575.501, .510, .801 (1993).
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Order ... obtain a litigation license""5 to bring a suit. OFAC
grants litigation licenses "on a case-by-case basis to permit certain
transactions otherwise prohibited by the regulations." '256
In at least two cases, U.S. plaintiffs succeeded in attaching
frozen Iraqi assets. 7 In these cases, the court determined that
the assets did not belong to Iraq at the time President Bush froze
them. The assets, therefore, actually belonged to the plaintiffs and
fell outside the scope of the Executive Order.
Many claims against frozen Iraqi assets remain pending in
U.S. courts. The United States has delayed258 and possibly
stymied the settlement of these cases. This is because the United
States has maintained most of the Iraqi assets frozen, and lent 9
$124 million2 " of the frozen assets to the UNCC to facilitate
payments to individual claimants in the "A" and "B" claim catego-
ries. As a result, the U.S. government has placed most of the
cases in its courts on hold, pending Iraq's funding the UNCC
process.
Frozen Iraqi assets total approximately $1.2 billion in the
United States26' and $5.5 billion worldwide.262 Claimants, how-
255. A.C. Monk & Co. v. UBAF Arab American Bank, 875 F. Supp. 311, 312
(E.D.N.C. 1995).
256. Semetex Corp. v. UBAF Arab American Bank, 853 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
257. Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry of Industry & Minerals, 27 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
1994); First City v. Rafidain and Central Bank of Iraq, Nos. 91-5308, 92-5501,93-5139, 1992
WL 296434 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6,1992). See also Consarc Corp. v. U.S. Treasury Dept. Office
of Foreign Assets Control, 871 F. Supp. 1463,1466 (D.D.C. 1994) (ordering OFAC to treat
assets it held as "unblocked property").
258. The Executive Orders and Iraqi Sanctions Regulations effectively toll the statute
of limitations in cases before U.S. courts because claims will not accrue until a plaintiff
receives a litigation license or is otherwise entitled to bring an action. A.C. Monk & Co.,
875 F. Supp. at 313.
259. Nicolas C. Ulmer & Javade Chaudhri, Corp. Claims for Damage Arising from Gulf
War, MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 1993, at 14, 16; Trevor Rowe, U.S.-Backed
Resolution Would Seize Up to $1.6 Billion in Iraqi Assets, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1992, at
A22.
260. Clinton Letter, supra note 136. The United States is "prepared to transfer to a
U.N.-managed escrow account up to $200 million in frozen Iraqi oil assets held in U.S.
financial institutions, provided that U.S. transfers do not exceed 50 percent of the total
amount transferred or contributed by all countries." Id.
261. Mark Fineman, Iraq Rehearses Its Pitch, A Newly Secure Saddam Hussein Hopes
To Persuade Clinton's Administration To Lift Trade Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17,1992,
at 1.
262. David Ignatius, No Pot of Gold Found In Hunt for Iraqi Assets, WASH. POST, Apr.
25, 1992, at Al.
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ever, have filed with OFAC over 1,400 domestic claims against
Iraq26 totalling approximately $5 billion 26 and seek to attach
these assets. One analyst suggests that the United States consoli-
date domestic claims, rather than try them among the different
jurisdictions.2' Adding hearing officers to the FCSC would
allow it to settle domestic claims relatively quickly and efficient-
ly.
266
When the U.S. government lends frozen Iraqi assets to the
UNCC,2 67 it favors the claimants before the UNCC, of whom
only a small minority are U.S. citizens. As one observer stated,
"[tlhe U.S. contribution [to the UNCC] is legally controversial as
it came from frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S.",26s  If the UNCC
cannot repay the lent funds,269 plaintiffs in U.S. courts may: (1)
wait longer to settle their cases; (2) receive less compensation; or
(3) be denied a domestic remedy. U.S. executive agencies, under
the President's authority, may lend frozen assets to achieve foreign
policy goals,27 like securing adequate funding for the UNCC."
The United States, other states, and the UNCC are looking
for other offshore Iraqi assets that evaded attachment, including
263. Magraw, supra note 177, at 488; Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, Jackie Wolcott,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Statement before the International Task
Force of the House Select Committee on Hunger, November 13, 1991, 3 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 851 (Nov. 18, 1991).
264. Hearing, supra note 113, at 2.
265. Magraw, supra note 177, at 489.
266. Id
267. Representative Bereuter of Nebraska, a member of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, derided OFAC's "transfer of more than $107 million from blocked Iraqi
accounts in United States banks to the United Nations [Compensation Committee]" as an
abuse and inexcusable practice. 140 CONG. REc. H2850, H2853 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1994)
[hereinafter Bereuter Statement] (statement of Rep. Bereuter).
268, Ulmer & Chaudhri, supra note 259, at 16.
269. The UNCC will repay governments which have transferred frozen Iraqi assets with
interest. Bettauer, supra note 3, at 421 n.27; S.C. Res. 778, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3117th
mtg. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/778 (1992).
270. The President has the power to order all attachments of foreign sovereigns' assets
null and void. The President's power to conduct foreign relations "includes the power to
represent United States nationals in their claims against foreign governments and the
President may settle the claims of United States nationals against the foreign state without
the consent of such nationals." Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't & St. of Iran, 513 F.
Supp. 864, 872 (C.D. Cal. 1981). See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-81
(1981) (finding the President has the power to suspend the claims of American nationals
against Iran).
271. UNSC Resolution 778 authorized lending frozen domestic assets to the UNCC.
S.C. Res. 778, supra note 269, 1.
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those personally belonging to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. 2
According to some reports, "Saddam Hussein may well have at his
disposal as much as $10-$30 billion in hidden assets."273 A state
that finds hidden Iraqi funds would seize them to satisfy its courts'
judgments against Iraq or lend such assets to the UNCC.
In sum, domestic remedies are stalled because the United
States has kept Iraqi assets frozen and lent some of these assets to
the UNCC. On April 28, 1994, the U.S. House of Representatives
adopted the Iraq Claims Act (H.R. 3221)274 by a vote of 398 to
5.275 This bill authorizes the FCSC to pay U.S. plaintiffs from
frozen Iraqi assets. Approval of this bill could be a potential
watershed for U.S. plaintiffs, 76 but Congress has not yet enacted
the Iraq Claims Act.277 To some extent, U.S. actions tied the
272. R. Richard Newcomb, Economic War Against Iraq, MIDDLE E. EXEcuTrvE REP.,
Apr. 1992, at 8, 24.
273. Id.
274. Iraq Claims Act, H.R. 3221, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 2, 1994). The House of
Representatives referred H.R. 3221 to the Senate on May 2, 1994. See H.R. 3221, Bill
Tracking Report, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT103 File. Representative Lee H.
Hamilton introduced H.R. 3221 on October 6, 1993. Id; Iraq: House Approves Claim
Payments, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1079 (Apr. 30, 1994) [hereinafter House Approves].
See also Marian Nash, Claims Settlement Legislation, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 314 (1994).
275. House Approves, supra note 274. See House Passes Bill Setting Up Iraqi Claims
Fund, Reuter Newswire, Apr. 28,1994, available in WL, INT-NEWS-C Database. Those
voting against the bill, Representatives Filner, Holden, Kanjorski, Klink, and McHale,
protested the admission of 533 former Iraqi soldiers to the United States as refugees. Itd;
2 Cong. Index (CCH) 37,191 (Apr. 28, 1994).
276. Among those vying for blocked Iraqi funds are
the U.S. government and major corporations whose contracts with Iraq were
placed in limbo after the United States imposed economic sanctions on Baghdad
in 1990. Relatives of servicemen killed in the Persian Gulf War and those killed
or injured in the 1987 Iraqi missile attack on the U.S.S. Stark are also seeking
funds.
House Approves, supra note 274. Injured U.S. soldiers and survivors total 2,400 claimants.
Hearing, supra note 113, at 21. The Iraqi Claims Act would give priority to members of
the armed forces, including those injured on the U.S.S. Stark. Bereuter Statement, supra
note 267, at H2853. One observer has suggested that Congress should appropriate funds
to "provide compensation to U.S. servicemen maltreated by Iraq while held as prisoners
of war." Glod, supra note 19, at 718.
The U.S. government has claims against Iraq for its defaulting on loans that the U.S.
government guaranteed. The U.S. Department of Justice recently agreed to pay $400
million to U.S. and foreign banks for bad debts owed by the Iraqi government. Norman
Kempster & Robin Wright, Some Iraqi Oil is Slipping Through Embargo, U.S. Says, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at A13, A17.
277. As of this writing, the U.S. Senate has not approved H.R. 3221, nor S. 1401-the
Senate version of the Iraq Claims Act. Senator Claiborne Pell introduced S. 1401 on
August 6, 1993. S. 1401, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug 6, 1993); S. 1401, Bill Tracking
Report, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT103 File. The Senate has not acted on S.
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fate of domestic claimants to that of the UNCC. In other words,
for U.S. domestic claimants to recover successfully on their claims,
the UNCC funding mechanism must work and repay the United
States. In turn, the United States must coordinate the attachment
and liquidation of frozen Iraqi assets with the settlement of
domestic suits.
VI. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE CLAIMS PROCESS
The Iraq claims process, and particularly the UNCC, face
many impediments. The first and most significant is Saddam
Hussein's lack of cooperation. Iraq defies UNSC sanctions27
and has never fully agreed to sell Iraq's oil pursuant to UNSC
resolutions.279 Iraq has declared that depriving it of its oil reve-
1401 since September 21, 1994, when the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment concluded hearings. Id. See Hearing, supra note
113; 139 CONG. REC. S10850 (Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Pell and text of bill).
Congress has failed to enact legislation to address domestic claims for nearly five years.
On October 24, 1990, Representative Dante B. Fascell, then-chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a bill entitled the Iraq Claims Act of 1990. Glod,
supra note 19, at 715.
278. In addition to its failure to comply, "Iraq has worked actively to evade the
sanction regime." Kempster & Wright, supra note 276, at A13. Iraq is surreptitiously
"selling between 80,000 and 100,000 barrels of oil a day" to its neighbors. Id. The
Multinational Interdiction Force intercepted 12 vessels smuggling Iraqi oil and contraband.
Text of a Letter from the President to Congress on Iraq's Compliance to UN Resolutions,
U.S. Newswire, Mar. 9, 1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database. Through agents and
front companies, Iraq is buying millions of dollars worth of sensitive missile parts from
China, France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. R. Jeffrey Smith, Iraq Buying Missile Parts
Covertly, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1995, at Al. The U.S. Customs Service is conducting
roughly 35 investigations of violations of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations. Id. On
September 15, 1994, a jury convicted Al M. Harb of violating the embargo by shipping
equipment for military use. Daniel Southerland, Va Businessman Convicted of Illegal
Shipments to Iraq, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at C5. U.S. District Judge Robert E.
Payne sentenced Harb to over seven years for aiding Iraq to rebuild weapons of mass
destruction. United States v. Harb, No. 3-94-CR-21 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 1994); Randolph
Goode, Trader Sentenced for Violating Embargo Against Iraq, Penalty Exceeds Range
Recommended by Guidelines, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 22,1994, at B7, available
in WL, ALLNEWS Database. On May 1, 1995, Walton W. McCarthy pled not guilty to
charges that he violated trade regulations by selling mobile bunkers. N.H. Man Charged
in Customs Sting, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2,1995, at 51; Judy Rakowsky, N.H. Man Accused
of Trade with Iraq, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1995, at 6; United States v. McCarthy, No.
95-10124-DPW (D. Mass. complaint filed Mar. 28, 1995).
279. Iraq refused to export oil under UNSC resolutions 706 (Aug. 15, 1991) and 712
(Sept. 19, 1991). Bettauer, supra note 3, at 421 n.27. The UNSC adopted resolution 706
in response to an Iraqi proposal to sell its oil to finance the purchase of essential foodstuffs
and medicines. S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES7O6 (1991). UNSC resolution 706 authorized the sale of $1.6 billion of Iraqi oil
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nues is an affront to its sovereignty.' Because of Iraq's resis-
tance, many argue that the compensation fund "remains a fund in
name only." 1
If Iraq agrees to the oil sales under the UNSC resolutions, this
would generate approximately $6.3 billion per year for the
UNCC.3 This figure relies on two assumptions: (1) that Iraq's
export capacity will return to its pre-Persian Gulf War level of 3.14
million barrels of oil per day, and (2) that the price will remain
constant at $21 per barrel.' Under these assumptions, "it
would take at least 20 to 30 years to finance the estimated $100
billion to $200 billion in losses suffered as a result of Iraq's
violations of international law."'  Critics further argue that the
$6.3 billion per year revenue is only sufficient to pay the interest
accruing on the principal amount of awards. 5  Furthermore,
whether Iraqi oil production can "regain the pre-[Persian] Gulf
War level" remains questionable because of the deterioration in
Iraq's oil-industry infrastructure.' For example, as of October
1994, Iraq "pumps about 600,000 [barrels of oil a day], enough to
meet its domestic needs."''
The result of Iraq's defiance of the UNSC resolutions is that
the UNCC is virtually penniless. The UNCC recently made the
first tranche of payments to some successful "B" claimants from
during a six-month period and maintained the setting aside of 30% of oil revenues to fund
the UNCC. Id 1, 4. UNSC resolution 712 provided more details of the arrangement.
S.C. Res. 712, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3008th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/712 (1991).
280. Ball, U.N. Claims Process, supra note 3, at 14. Another observer termed the
UNCC regime, "an interference in the internal affairs of Iraq." Brower, supra note 45, at
13.
281. Ball, U.N. Claims Process, supra note 3, at 14.
282. Brower, supra note 45, at 13.
283. Brower, Good Start, supra note 37, at 9. Before the Persian Gulf War, Iraq earned
"about $21 billion a year from oil sales." Schmitt, supra note 1, at B9. Iraq has reserves
of 100 billion barrels of crude oil. Craig Turner & Robin Wright, Iran, Iraq: Teaming Up
Again Against a Common Foe?, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1995, at A2.
284. Brower, supra note 45, at 12.
285. See deKieffer, supra note 5, at 8.
286. Edwin Chen, Ending Iraq Sanctions No Panacea, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20,1994, at A6.
See also S.C. Res 986, supra note 49, 9(a) (discussing the need for parts and equipment
to operate the pipeline).
287. Kraft, supra note 152, at H2. Iraqi Oil Minister Safa Hadi Jawad projects that Iraq
could export two million barrels of oil a day once the UNSC lifts the embargo. James
Tanner, Russian to Develop Oil Fields In Iraq After Embargo Ends, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
June 27, 1995, at 3. See Kempster & Wright, supra note 276, at A13 (discussing Iraqi oil
sales in violation of the U.N. embargo).
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lent funds, but the UNCC "does not have the money to pay larger
claims., 288 The current liquidity problem and the overall funding
impasse are significant impediments yet to be overcome.
The high cost of administering the entire process also impedes
the efficient settlement of claims against Iraq. The final cost of
housing, staffing, and running the UNCC will be enormous.289
Though governments garnish a small processing fee from claimants
who are compensated by the UNCC in order to recover their
administrative costs,29° Iraq must bear the burden of "heavy
administrative and legal costs of [the UNCC's] processing the
claims."
, 291
Critics argue that Iraq cannot pay the principal amount of the
awards, nor the interest accrued on the principal. Therefore, they
question the usefulness of tacking on to Iraq the extra cost of
administering a large, international bureaucracy.2' The UNCC's
potentially high administrative costs might reduce the total
compensation it awards to claimants. If the UNCC prorates
awards, each dollar of administrative costs reduces the amount of
the awards for successful claimants. Without the work of the
UNCC, however, most claimants would not receive any awards.
Some observers believe that the UNCC will not fully compen-
sate all injured persons and can only pay damages on a pro rata
basis. 293 These observers charge that the Governing Council's
"biggest unresolved political issue is to determine the priority of
claims payment, and what percentage of each claim will be
paid., 294  For those, however, who have little or no hope of
recovering their losses or who have written them off, even
recovering a few pennies on the dollar is worthwhile. Certainly
288. Naughton, supra note 186.
289. The UNCC's 1996 budget is $22.9 million, which represents an 18% reduction from
its 1995 budget. Ma, supra note 123.
290. Decision 18, supra note 171, 1 1(a).
291. Stephanie Nebehay, Kuwait Urges Speedy Reimbursement of Oil Claim, Reuters
World Service, Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. Iraq must
also "pay the full costs of the Special Commission [U.N. Special Commission on Iraq] and
the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]" to enforce the UNSC sanctions. S.C.
Res. 706, supra note 279, at 2.
292. The UNCC secretariat staff grew from 70 in April 1994 to 107 in November 1994.
Jannuzzo, supra note 72; Bettauer, supra note 3, at 419.
293. Ulmer, supra note 41, at 92. An analysis of "the history of international
arbitration reveals awards are around 40% of the amounts claimed." Bahree, supra note
143, at 4.
294. Ulmer & Chaudhri, supra note 259, at 16.
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some compensation, albeit prorated and belated, is better than
none, and maximizing the level of pro rata compensation should
be the default goal of the UNCC.
29P
Iraq took a significant step in 1994 that may have foretold its
willingness to cooperate with the international community. On
November 10, 1994, Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary Command
Council and the Iraqi National Assembly recognized "the sover-
eignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political
independence. '' 21 Observers described Iraq's recognition of
Kuwait as an "extremely positive development because it seemed
logical for it to lead to a policy of full cooperation. ' '2' Although
this remains to be seen, Iraq's recognition of Kuwait represented
a significant stride toward the lifting of sanctions.
On November 14, 1994, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright held
"the highest-level Iraqi-American meeting since the [Persian] Gulf
War. 22 8  Although this meeting may have portended progress
toward Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions, Ambassador
Albright said she met with Deputy Prime Minister Aziz only in her
capacity as President of the UNSC during the month of November
1994.29
The hard line stance taken by the United States and the
United Kingdom-"insisting that Iraq must first comply fully with
all U.N. Security Council resolutions" 3 -- is a policy that is "at
odds with that of [Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V.] Kozyrev
and, to some extent, the French government.""3 1 One observer
alleged that U.S. officials privately admit that the United States
will veto any resolution which lifts UNSC sanctions before the
295. The UNCC, though not admitting that funds would be insufficient to pay the full
asserted value of all claims, acknowledged in 1991 that if funds were insufficient it would
make pro rata payments as "funds become available." Decision 1, supra note 64, 9.
296. Stanley Meisler, Iraq Officially Recognizes Kuwai4 but US. Is Skeptical, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at Al. See Letter Dated 12 November 1994 from the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Iraq Addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/1288 (1994).
297. Meisler, supra note 296, at A7.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Polish, supra note 51, at A8.
301. Meisler, supra note 296, at A7.
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downfall of Saddam Hussein. ° U.S. officials, however, maintain
that "[t]he leadership in Iraq is not itself a subject of U.N.
sanctions. 3 3  The United States also has conditioned easin
sanctions to Iraq complying with human rights accords,
releasing 600 prisoners and hostages, and returning stolen Kuwaiti
property.
30 5
The Russian and French ambassadors to the U.N. suggested
that UNSC members will consider lifting the sanctions on the Iraqi
sale of oil if the Hussein government fully cooperates for six
months. 306 Russia and France,307 two permanent members of
the UNSC, seem interested in restoring full trade with Iraq to
exploit investment opportunities3°s and to assure that Iraq repays
302. Nancy Gibbs, A Show of Strength: Clinton's Charge Sends Saddam into Retreat, but
Taming Him is Another Matter, TIME, Oct. 24, 1994, at 34. The U.S. position is that
"Hussein cannot be trusted to keep his promises." Robin Wright & Stanley Meisler,
Baghdad Admits to Larger Program of Deadly Weapons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23,1995, at Al,
A27. UNSC sanctions on Iraq do not have an expiration date. To lift the sanctions, the
UNSC must adopt a resolution. This allows any permanent member to veto such a
resolution. In the future, UNSC sanctions might include an expiration date. Interview
with Professor Hurst Hannum, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in Medford, Mass.
(Aug. 25, 1995).
303. Wright, supra note 192, at A9.
304. Jack Redden, Iraq's Difficult Route to Ending Oil Embargo, Reuters, July 2, 1995,
available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, CURNWS File; Letter to Congress, supra note 278
(discussing Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights Max van der
Stoel's report on Iraqi abuses).
305. Letter to Congress, supra note 278; Wright, supra note 192, at A9. See Letter
Dated 9 January 1995 from the Chargg d'Affaires A.!L of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait
to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 50th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/13 (1995) (English version). For example, Iraqi officials stole "the
spectacular Islamic art collection" from Kuwait's national museum. Greg Myre, Looters
Target Iraq's Antiquities, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at A16.
306. Stanley Meisler, Iraq Makes Official Its Renunciation of Kuwait Claims, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at A4.
307. France "opened a diplomatic interests section in Baghdad" on March 6, 1995.
Don't Be Fooled by Baghdad Again, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at B6.
308. James Tanner, Iraq, Russia Agree On Oil Projects For Embargo's End, WALL ST.
J., June 27, 1995, at A8. Russia signed a contract with Iraq allowing Lukoil, Russia's
largest oil company, to develop projects in Iraq's West Qurna and North Rumalia oil fields
once the UNSC lifts sanctions. Id. Iraq soon will enter into similar contracts with Societd
Nationale Elf Aquitaine and Total, two French oil companies, to develop several oil fields,
including the Majnoon. ld. U.S. restrictions and Iraqi policy preclude U.S. companies
from concluding oil contracts. Id.; Robyn Meredith, Oil Deals, USA TODAY, June 27,
1995, at lB. China is interested in selling arms to Iraq. Richard Corliss, Suddenly,
Saddam Again, TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at 54.
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the debt owed to their creditors.' To date, maintaining sanc-
tions against Iraq may have cost Russia $43 billion.310 In regard
to lifting the sanctions on Iraq, "France, China and Russia were
working in that direction, 31M but this was dashed in early Octo-
ber 1994 when Iraq moved approximately 80,000 troops near the
Kuwaiti border. Iraq's presumed attempt to "bully" the
UNSC into lifting sanctions backfired when the United States
protested, deployed its military in Operation Vigilant Warrior,313
and solidified its position, against prematurely lifting sanctions.
314
The international community cannot make progress in settling
claims against Iraq until the UNSC lifts its sanctions. The United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq ("UNSCOM"), 31 5 headed
by Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus, is supervising Iraq's compliance
with disarmament, monitoring,316 freeing detained Kuwaiti and
third-country nationals, returning property, and stopping repression
of the Kurds and Shiite Muslims.311 The principal obstacle now
standing in the way of lifting economic sanctions is Iraq's failure
to comply with the U.N.-supervised destruction of Iraq's biological
weapons.31 As of February 1995, Ekeus was optimistic that
Baghdad would be in full compliance in 1995.319 Analysts agreed
309. Thomas Sancton, No Longer Fenced In, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 36. Iraq owes the
French government at least $8.7 billion (for loan guarantees) and Russia $7 billion. Gibbs,
supra note 302, at 34.
310. Robin Wright & Carol J. Williams, Iraq Trying to Buy 4,000 Russian Tanks,
Defector Tells U.S. Officials, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, at A5. This figure includes $20
billion from "unfulfilled trade and oil contracts." Id.
311. Art Pine, Clinton Approves 38,000 Troops to Counter Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1994, at Al, A12; Robin Wright, Iraq Concealing Biological Arms Effort, U.N. Says, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1995, at A6.
312. Pine, supra note 311, at A12.
313. Gibbs, supra note 302, at 34.
314. Art Pine, U.S., Iraq Move More Troops Toward Kuwait, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994,
at Al, A16.
315. UNSC resolution 661 established the UNSCOM. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 11, '1
6. UNSCOM's regional headquarters is located in Bahrain. Iraq Delivers Long Report
on Biological Arms to U.N., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at A4 [hereinafter Report on
Biological Arms].
316. The U.N. will have to spend substantial amounts to monitor Iraq and maintain
peace, including the $60 million it allocated to the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission.
Levy, supra note 13, at 547-48.
317. President George Bush's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's
Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 866, 868 (May 18, 1992).
318. Wright, supra note 311, at Al.
319. Id.
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that the UNSC might lift sanctions by October 1995, "at the earli-
est.
320
On July 1, 1995, after four years of denial, senior Iraqi
officials admitted to Ekeus and UNSCOM officials that Iraq
developed a major offensive biological warfare program before the
Persian Gulf War.321 Iraqi officials, who claimed that Iraq
burned the toxic materials before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf
War in 1991, agreed to provide UNSCOM a detailed report.
Because Iraq concealed its biological weapons program and
recently resisted destroying some ballistic missile producing equip-
ment,3" U.S. officials challenged Iraq's assertions that it had
complied with UNSC resolutions, and renewed their efforts to
maintain the UNSC sanctions regime.3 24  U.S. officials doubted
that Iraqi compliance in regard to biological weapons would be
320. Kraft, supra note 152, at H2.
321. R. Jeffrey Smith, Iraq Had Program For Germ Warfare; Big Stockpiles Destroyed,
U.N. Team Told, WASH. POST, July 6, 1995, at Al. Ekeus' meeting with Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz and Oil Production Minister General Amer Rasheed confirmed allied
suspicions that Dr. Rihab Taha directed Iraq's biological weapons program at a secret
factory at Al Hakam. Since 1989, this factory produced two deadly bacteria: Clostridium
botulinum, which causes botulism, and Bacillus anthracis, which causes anthrax. UNSCOM
officials suspected that Iraq had such a program after Iraq failed to account for 17 tons of
imported biological growth medium. Stanley Meisler, Iraq Admits to Germ Weapons, L.A.
TIMEs, July 6, 1995, at Al, A6; Barbara Crossette, Iraq Admits It Produced Germ Arsenal,
New York Times News Service, July 6, 1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database. Iraq
tested biological weapons on sheep, donkeys, monkeys, and dogs. Iraq May Still Have
Deadly Arsenal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at 2A. Iraq also produced
aflatoxin (which causes liver cancer), Clostridium perfringens (which causes gas gangrene),
trichothecene mycotoxins, ricin, and wheat cover smut. Id. U.S. officials stated that
Ekeus' recent report "shows Iraq's vast deception effort." Gary Borg, Iraq Contends UN
Inspector Lied About Arms Programs, CHI. TRIB., Oct 13, 1995, at 13. Iraqi Vice President
Taha Muhieddine Maarouf denied charges that Iraq misled U.N. inspectors regarding its
weapons programs. Id.
322. Meisler, supra note 321, at A6.
323. Iraq Refuses to Destroy Missile Machines, Sanctions to be Extended, Associated
Press, July 7, 1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database; Iraqi Admission, USA TODAY,
July 6, 1995, at 5A. But see Iraq Gives New Data on Ballistic Missile Program, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at A9.
324. Smith, supra note 321, at Al. Recent reports of Iraq's bid to construct nuclear
weapons for use against the U.S.-led forces in the Persian Gulf War bolstered U.S. efforts
to maintain the UNSC sanctions regime. Robin Wright, Iraq's Rush to Get Nuclear Bomb
for Gulf War Disclosed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1995, at Al; Barbara Crossette, Crash
Nuclear Program by Iraq is Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1995, at 3; Mark Hibbs, IAEA
General Conference Addresses Arms Testing, NUCLEONICS WK., Sept. 21, 1995, at 14.
According to other recent reports, Iraq is trying to rebuild a vast army by purchasing 4,000
sophisticated T-72 and T-80 tanks from Russia. Wright & Williams, supra note 310, at A5.
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sufficient to warrant the lifting of sanctions in September 1995.32
U.S. Ambassador Albright said that to date, "no initial Iraqi
weapons declaration has been truthful., 326  Verification of the
destruction of Iraq's biological weapon capabilities could take
months. 327 On August 5, 1995, Iraq submitted to Ekeus a 530-
page report on its biological weapons program, which it termed "a
full, final and complete declaration.""28 Ekeus, however, initially
said that "the document doesn't appear to be thoroughly com-
plete., 329 Ekeus asserted that he was unsure if he could "declare
Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction by September
[1995], "33o the next UNSC review of sanctions.33' Iraq, howev-
er, threatened to stop cooperating with the U.N. if UNSCOM did
not complete its mission by the end of August 1995.332
Some observers view Iraq's admission on biological weapons
as marking the beginning of its full compliance with UNSC
resolutions. On July 16, 1995, Saddam Hussein pardoned
William Barloon and David Daliberti, the two U.S. citizens
convicted of illegally entering Iraq,334 after each served 114 days
325. Robin Wright, Hussein Vows No Cooperation if Sanctions Stay, L.A. TIMES, July
18, 1995, at Al, A6.
326. Stanley Meisler, Iraq Supplied False Data, U.S. Asserts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995,
at All.
327. Wright, supra note 325, at A6. U.S. biological weapons specialist Richard Sperson
arrived in Iraq on July 17, 1995 to lead a U.N. inspection team. Id. Mr. Charles Duelfer,
UNSCOM Deputy Chairman, hoped "that the UNSCOM could verify the destruction of
the biological weapons within the next few months." Farhan Haq, Iraq: Yet Another
Extension of U.N. Sanctions on Baghdad, Inter Press Service, July 11, 1995, available in
LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, CURNWS File.
328. Report on Biological Arms, supra note 315, at A4.
329. What's News-World News, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 1. On October 13, 1995,
Ekeus reported that Iraq is "still withholding many details about its clandestine [weapons]
programs." U.N. Arms Monitor Says Iraq Still Withholds Data, New York Times News
Service, Oct. 14, 1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database.
330. Report on Biological Arms, supra note 315, at A4. U.N. inspectors may require
one year to analyze "a mass of data finally handed over." Michael Littlejohns, UN
Sanctions on Iraq to Stay, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 14, 1995, at 2.
331. The September 1995 meeting represented the UNSC's 27th review of Iraqi
sanctions. UN Refuses to Lift Sanctions on Iraq, VANCOUVER SUN, July 12, 1995, at A12,
available in WL, ALLNEWS Database.
332. Leon Barkho, Iraqi Germ Data Important But May Be Lacking, Reuters North
American Wire, Aug. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. As of this
writing, Iraq has not followed up on this threat.
333. Crossette, supra note 321. UNSCOM's Charles Duelfer remarked that Iraq's
disclosure was "a positive step." Id.
334. Robin Wright, Iraq Releases Two Americans Held for Crossing Its Border, L.A.
TIMES, July 17, 1995, at Al.
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of their eight-year sentences at the high security Abu Ghraib
prison. 35 On July 30, 1995, Hussein issued a decree granting
amnesty to thousands of Iraqi political prisoners. 3 6  Observers
saw the release of the two U.S. citizens and the recent grants of
amnesty as gestures comprising "part of a broad effort to win
international support for the easing of those sanctions."3 7
Saddam Hussein's efforts to win international favor and lift the
UNSC sanctions also included firing both his half-brother, Watban
Ibrahim, who served as interior minister 3  and his cousin,
General Ali Hassan Majid, who served as Iraqi defense minister
and "earned the sobriquet Butcher of the Kurds. 339  These
recent events may indicate that the international community may
soon find a solution to the impediments facing the proper
functioning of the UNCC, namely a more cooperative Iraq.'
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS To IMPEDIMENTS
Five possible solutions to the impediments facing the UNCC
follow. This list is by no means exhaustive. These proposed
solutions presuppose the continuation of the UNCC. Iraq,
however, would like the UNSC to abolish the UNCC. Elimination
of the UNCC, though making any proposed solution unnecessary,
would deny victims just compensation and let a dictator off the
hook. Dismantling the UNCC may be "akin to advocating a thesis
that tyrants who squander their natural and human resources in
335. 2 Freed By Iraq Celebrate, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 1995, at 1.
336. All Iraq Political Prisoners Are Due to Be Freed, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1995, at
A12. On July 22, 1995, Hussein issued a decree granting amnesty to army deserters
awaiting the severing of their ears or other body parts. Id
337. Wright, supra note 334, at A6.
338. Saddam Sacks a Henchman, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), July 22, 1995, at 46
[hereinafter Saddam Sacks].
339. Hussein Fires Defense Minister, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1995, at A6. Hussein
appointed Majid governor of occupied Kuwait in 1990, but recently demoted him to "a
lowly post as a Baath party apparatchik." Saddamn Sacks, supra note 338, at 46.
340. On August 13, 1995, Iraq announced "that it is ready to reveal military secrets it
has withheld for years." Mary Curtius, Iraq Offers to Reveal Arms Data, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1995, at Al. Hussein blamed defector Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Majid for Iraq's
previous lack of cooperation. Id Some senior Iraqi officials "are believed to be
advocating the acceptance of [UNSCI Resolution 986." At Polls, Saddam Stands Alone,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 16,1995, at 6 [hereinafter Saddam Stands Alone]. See S.C. Res.
986, supra note 49.
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pursuit of military adventures gain immunity from any further
accounting before international tribunals for their wrongs.
341
A. Wait for a Change in Government or Policy
One possible solution is to wait for a change in government
because Saddam Hussein will not retain power indefinitely in Iraq.
Some observers believe that Hussein's narrow political base and
constant juggling suggest that his rule is vulnerable.' 2  The
UNSC may play a waiting game until a successor government
comes to power and assumes responsibility for Iraq's obligations.
Waiting for change in the position of the Iraqi government, or a
change in the government itself, is certainly part of the present
UNSC policy.'M Saddam Hussein, however, has shown remark-
able tenacity in maintaining power.' Despite Iraq's weakened
condition, a change in government or policy is probably not very
likely in the immediate future 45  Waiting for a new, more
341. GIod, supra note 19, at 719.
342. Saddam Sacks, supra note 338, at 46. Gen. Wafiq Al Samarrai, former head of
Iraqi military intelligence, defected to Syria in December 1994 and joined the Iraqi
National Congress, the opposition umbrella group. Former Military Intelligence Chief Joins
Opposition, 41 APS Diplomat Recorder, Dec. 3, 1994, available in WL, ALLNEWS
Database.
On August 8, 1995, Saddam Hussein's daughters Raghad and Rana, their husbands,
Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal Majid and Lt. Col. Saddam Kamel Majid (these two brothers are
also distant cousins of Saddam Hussein and nephews of Gen. Ali Hassan Majid), and 30
other officers, aides, wives, and children defected to Jordan. King Hussein granted them
asylum. Norman Kempster, Daughters of Hussein, Other Top Iraqis Defect, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1995, at Al, All; Curtius, supra note 340, at A9. Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal Majid
was the "architect of Iraq's military machine" and "key procurer of arms and technology."
Mary Curtius, Iraqis' Exit a Dream Come True for US., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1995, at A5.
U.S. officials said this disaffection in Saddam Hussein's inner circle underscored "the
extent of Saddam's isolation." Mary Curtius, Iraqi Calls for Ouster of Hussein, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at Al. Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal Majid recently stated that
"opposition within Iraq is ready to overthrow Hussein's regime." Defector Says Hussein
Foes Ready for Coup, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at A4.
343. Gibbs, supra note 302, at 34.
344. Smith & Goshko, supra note 42, at Al; Wright, supra note 192, at A10. But see
Shibley Telhami, A Baghdad Family Feud With International Effect, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1995, at M1, M6 (asserting that some "Arab states [suspect] that the United States has
secretly conspired to keep Hussein in power" to maintain the U.S. military presence in the
Persian Gulf, assure the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and isolate
Baghdad).
345. On June 14, 1995, Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard forces quickly defeated
an attempted coup led by Brigadier General Turki Ismael al-Dulaimi. Anti-Saddam Coup
Fails Near Baghdad, Sources Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 16, 1995, at A30; Ed Blanche,
Iraqi Rebels Claim Sunni Clans Gathering Against Saddam, Associated Press, June 18,
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cooperative government also amplifies the problem of interest
accruing on the principal amount of the awards. The international
community must remain patient for this solution to work and
continue to exert diplomatic pressure.
Iraq also may decide to change its policy and comply with
UNSC resolutions. Presently, this appears to be a more likely
scenario. Once Iraq fully complies with all of the UNSC resolu-
tions, the UNSC should lift the sanctions. At that point, U.S.
policy opposing the lifting of sanctions "may look isolated."'
Once the UNSC lifts the sanctions, the international community
will have two priorities. First, the UNSC should promote
democracy in Iraq. The international community cannot imple-
ment a regional security plan until Iraq escapes Hussein's tyranny.
Second, the global community should provide assistance for the
reconstruction of Iraq. One observer suggested that the interna-
tional community provide Iraq with financial assistance modeled
after the Marshall Plan.347 Such a reconstruction plan also would
ensure the long term stability of the UNCC framework.
B. Enact More Drastic UNSC Sanctions
To force Iraq to comply, the UNSC could impose or threaten
to impose more drastic sanctions. Actually imposing more drastic
sanctions, however, does not appear to have UNSC support.
Reluctance to impose harsher sanctions mainly stems from
economic self-interest and humanitarian reasons. Many states are
eager to do business again with Iraq.4 More severe sanctions
might increase the already well publicized human suffering in
Iraq.4 9 In fact, before early October 1994, several members of
1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database. In March 1995, Hussein quelled an
attempted coup and assassination plot against his son, Uday. Jamie Dettmer, Saddam's
Son Was Target in Attempted Coup, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at Al. Uday leads his
own militia, the Fedayeen. Robin Wright, Son May Be Hussein's Worst Nightmare, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, A17.
346. Wright, supra note 192, at A9.
347. Glod, supra note 19, at 720.
348. Sancton, supra note 309, at 36; Tanner, supra note 308, at A8.
349. Kuwait arrests 60 Iraqi boat people, United Press International, July 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, CURNWS File. UNSC sanctions have led to
severe shortages of food and medical supplies. Id. One fourth of the Iraqi population, or
five million people, is either without food or dependent on food handouts. Id.; Millions
Need Food in Iraq, U.N. Agency Says, Associated Press, July 4, 1995, available in WL,
ALLNEWS Database. Iraq "has been reduced to a nation of beggars and bandits." Mary
Curtius, Iraq on Road to Nowhere?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1995, at Al. Iraq's rate of
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the UNSC indicated their support for lifting the sanctions, but this
discussion ceased following a large movement of Iraqi troops
toward Kuwait.3 °
The UNSC is aware of the human suffering in Iraq since its
imposition of the sanctions, but it does not accept any responsibili-
ty for the suffering.351 U.S. officials state that Iraqi authorities
bear full responsibility for any suffering in Iraq that results from
their refusal to implement UNSC resolutions. 352  It remains
unclear whether Iraq would also be responsible for any additional
human suffering that the imposition of new, more drastic sanctions
would cause.
The UNSC faces the problem of its threats being ineffectual
when insufficient support exists for actually imposing more drastic
sanctions. Iraq is all too aware of this dilemma. The only way to
put real teeth into the UNSC's threats of imposing more drastic
sanctions is to foster a change in political will. The United States,
as the leader of the Persian Gulf War alliance against Iraq,
probably would have to lead such an initiative to toughen the
UNSC's stance on Iraq.
C. Impose UN Control of Iraqi Oil Production
The most drastic sanction that the UNSC could authorize is
an action to seize Iraqi oil fields and control oil production. A
UNSC resolution, finding that the failure to compensate constitutes
a further breach of the peace or a threat to peace, would facilitate
such an action. This would enable the UNSC to act again under
its Chapter VII powers.353 The UNSC also might justify such a
resolution as a humanitarian intervention. Seizing Iraqi oil fields
inflation has risen above 5,000%. Id. at A6. Iraq has issued food ration cards. Kraft,
supra note 45, at A10.
350. Pine, supra note 311, at A12.
351. The Iraqi "regime has little regard for the needs of even its own populace."
Bettauer, supra note 3, at 423. Allied planes dropped humanitarian relief supplies over
Iraq after the Persian Gulf War. Iraq protested that these flights violated its sovereignty.
Identical Letters Dated 8 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed Respectively to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/22459 (1991).
352. Letter to Congress on Iraqi Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions,
President Clinton, 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 675, 675 (Oct. 4, 1993).
353. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. See supra note 14 (discussing the UNSC's Chapter VII
powers).
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and controlling production would require the UNSC to send both
U.N. blue-helmet peacekeepers 3m and oil workers into Iraq.
This possible solution certainly would face strong opposition.
Iraq and other members of the international community would
challenge it as an egregious breach of Iraq's territorial sovereignty
and a violation of the principle of the sovereign equality of states.
It also most likely would lead to direct military conflict and result
in more loss of life. The UNSC probably would have difficulty
finding states willing to contribute troos, especially after its recent
experiences in Somalia and Bosnia. This option probably
would fail a cost-benefit analysis because military operations are
very expensive.
D. Lend Frozen Iraqi Assets to UNCC
The United States already lent to the UNCC some Iraqi assets
previously frozen in the United States.356  Following the U.N.
Secretary-General's suggestion,357 more countries may follow suit.
Japan remains one notable holdout; it stated that it will not lend
354. Some scholars facetiously advance that "Chapter VI %" of the U.N. Charter
authorizes peace-keeping operations. See generally U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMETS, A REvIEw OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING
(1990).
355. Jennifer Lin, The Perils of Peacekeeping, The Humiliating Lessons of Bosnia and
Somalia Raise Questions About Using U.N. Peacekeepers in Future Missions, MORNING
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, WA), Dec. 25, 1994, at C2, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database;
David Rogers & Thomas E. Ricks, Congress Is Uneasy With Peacekeeping As General
Urges U.S. Role in Bosnia, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1993, at C23; Bob Deans, Bosnia May
Be Victim of Somalia Disaster, Voters' Message: Don't Use the U.S. Military in U.N.
Peacekeeping Efforts Unless the Risk of Casualties Is Low, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 9,
1993, at A5, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database.
356. Clinton Letter, supra note 136; Note Verbale Dated 30 November 1992 from the
United States Mission to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/24902 (1992).
357. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 778 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. S/25863 (1993).
As at [sic] 30 April 1993, 62 countries had replied to the Secretary-General's
request for information on steps taken to implement resolution 778 (1992). Of
these four indicated holding amounts, as follows: Greece, $276,000 in proceeds
from the sale of Iraqi oil products; Japan, $48.88 million, subject to third-party
rights so that none of it could be transferred to the escrow account; Tunisia, $15.8
million, already partially used to settle Iraq's debt to Tunisia; the United States,
$637.4 million, $200 million of which it would transfer to the escrow account
provided that amount at no time exceeded 50 per cent of total funds contributed
or transferred to the account. The remaining 58 countries stated that they had
no petroleum or petroleum products or frozen assets subject to the provisions of
resolution 778 (1992).
Iraq-Kuwait Situation, supra note 167, at 430.
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to the UNCC Iraqi assets frozen in Japanese banks. 358 These
loans have been crucial to the survival of the compensation
process. 359 Lending frozen Iraqi assets to the UNCC, however, is
only a short term solution because the sum of all of the frozen
Iraqi assets throughout the world will not cover the more than
$162 billion worth of claims submitted to the UNCC. The UNCC
will also have to repay the loans of frozen Iraqi assets,3" which
can only happen after Iraq complies with the UNSC resolutions,
the UNSC lifts sanctions, and Iraq exports oil.
E. Issue Bonds on Iraqi Debt to Pay Claims
To date, no one has proposed that the UNCC or some private
international financial institution issue bonds on Iraqi debt.36'
Future oil export revenues would secure such bonds. This
arrangement would allow the UNCC to collect capital to pay
claimants by issuing bonds. The issuer would pay off the investors
(bond purchasers) with the expected revenue from Iraqi oil
exports. If the risk of non-repayment becomes too high, however,
this might drive the bonds' interest rate up beyond the point where
any issuance of bonds is economically feasible. The issuance of
bonds on Iraqi debt presently does not appear to be a viable
option because of the high risk of non-repayment, but once Iraqi
oil revenue is forthcoming, as many hope it will be soon, the
issuance of Iraqi debt bonds could well serve the needs of the
international community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The international community cannot proceed in settling the
claims against Iraq until the UNSC lifts its sanctions. Although
many observers expected that the real battle over sanctions within
the UNSC would take place in May 1995, 62 as of this writing,
sanctions remain in place. Iraq refuses to cooperate fully with
UNSC resolutions, most notably the UNSC program to eliminate
358. Iraq-Kuwait Situation, supra note 167, at 430. See generally Rowe, supra note 259,
at A22.
359. Affaki, supra note 2, at 517.
360. See supra note 269 (discussing the UNCC's obligation to repay loans).
361. But see S.C. Res. 986, supra note 49, 10 (discussing the limited use of letters of
credit drawn against future oil sales to finance certain U.N. activities and purchase oil
pipeline equipment).
362. Meisler, supra note 306, at A4.
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weapons of mass destruction. Iraq has asserted that it will not
cooperate until the UNSC lifts the sanctions.?6 Iraq apparently
is playing a game of diplomatic brinkmanship and attempting to
put the onus on the UNSC to lift the sanctions before it will
cooperate further. Iraq's strategy, however, may have created a
new impasse in its dealings with the UNSC.
The initial outlook for the UNCC was grim. As one interna-
tional lawyer prognosticated, "I'll bet you this [UNCC] thing is not
going to get more than two cents on the dollar ... [and] the
machine isn't going to produce anything except jobs for interna-
tional bureaucrats."3" One observer predicted that Iraqi opposi-
tion to the UNCC system would provoke "the mother of all
international arbitration battles."365 Iraq's diplomatic overtures,
including its recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and independence,
developments in the Iraqi opposition, along with the UNCC's
significant progress in processing the claims, however, indicate that
the future of the claims process might be brighter than it was a
year ago. The political and economic pressures currently in place
soon may oblige Iraq to comply with the UNSC resolutions and
fund the UNCC.36
The UNSC renewed sanctions on Iraq on September 8,
1995,367 and will review sanctions every sixty days thereafter.3"
Based on recent political and military developments,369 the
363. Wright, supra note 325, at A6. U.S. officials noted "recent Iraqi threats to return
to a policy of confrontation if the [U.N. Security] Council decides to maintain sanctions."
U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 638, 641 (Aug. 14, 1995).
364. State Department Stalls, supra note 247.
365. Glod, supra note 19, at 721.
366. U.S. leverage on Iraq "is greater now than at any point since the triumphal windup
to the 1991 Persian Gulf War." Robin Wright, U.S. Intensifies Efforts to Topple Iraqi
Regime, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at All. James A. Baker II, former Secretary of
State, recently stated "I think we have Saddam Hussein in a... pretty tight cage now."
Federal News Service Washington Package, Oct. 11, 1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS
Database (statement of Baker before the National Press Club).
367. U.N. Extends Iraq Sanctions to Gain Cooperation on Arms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1995, at A24.
368. Wright, supra note 334, at A6.
369. Stanley Meisler, 1,400 GIs Going to Kuwait as Warning to Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1995, at Al. The United States deployed troops to Kuwait in response to "unusual
movements" of Iraqi forces. Id. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau met with
King Hussein of Jordan to persuade him to stop purchasing Iraqi oil under a loophole in
the UNSC resolutions. Id. at A8. Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Majid claimed that Iraq
intended to invade Kuwait and parts of Saudi Arabia in August 1995. Iraq Reportedly
Planned Attacks on Neighbors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at A4. Sheik Ahmed al
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UNSC probably will not lift its sanctions on Iraq in November
1995, nor January 1996. If the UNSC does not lift sanctions by
early 1996, it is not likely that it will do so until after the U.S.
elections in November 1996. Because almost no constituency in
the United States supports lifting the sanctions, and with no
potential for political gain, candidates are not likely to campaign
on a platform favorable to Iraq."T° A change in Iraq's govern-
ment a, 1 however, might alter this timeline. Thus, the UNSC
probably will not lift sanctions until early 1997,372 approximately
six years after the Persian Gulf War.
If UNSCOM soon reports that Iraq has destroyed its biologi-
cal weapons arsenal, however, France and Russia should take
advantage of this narrow window of opportunity to push for the
lifting of sanctions. Once funding is available, the UNCC will
prove itself a successful and innovative international institution.
After the UNSC lifts sanctions, it could reimpose them if Iraq
fails to comply with the UNCC regime. The UNSC already has
Hamoud al Jabbar al Sabah, however, stated that Kuwaiti officials had not detected any
Iraqi military activity. Jim Mann, U.S. Takes Steps Against Iraqi Troop Moves, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at Al, A6. Observers also expect that Lt. Gen. Majid will give
Ekeus new information that will delay the'UNSC's lifting of sanctions. U.N. Envoy
Expected to See Iraqi Defector, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1995, at A8. Sir John Weston, the
United Kingdom delegate to the U.N., expects the UNSC to renew its sanctions in
November 1995. Littlejohns, supra note 330, at 2.
370. See Redden, supra note 304; Anne Reifenberg, Analysts Say Stability in Oil Prices
Appears a Good Bet for Rest of Year, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 19, 1995, at 13.
371. Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council unanimously approved Saddam Hussein
as the sole candidate in the October 15, 1995 referendum to confirm him as president for
the next seven years. What's News-World-Wide, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 11, 1995, at 1;
Referendum Set on Reelecting Hussein, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at A4. The referendum
posed a single yes-or-no question to Iraq's eligible voters, "Do you agree to Saddam
Hussein assuming the post of president of the Republic of Iraq?" Saddam Stands Alone,
supra note 340, at 6. Voters from the three Kurdish governates did not participate in the
referendum. Id. Iraqi officials reported that Hussein won 99.96% of the vote and that
99.5% of Iraq's 8.4 million eligible voters casted ballots. Court of the Chameleon, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 1995, at 18; 99.96% of Votes in Iraqi Referendum Endorse
Hussein, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A7. Hussein has ruled Iraq for 27 years. Kraft,
supra note 45, at Al. Most of the numerous election posters appeared in English rather
than Arabic. Id. at A10. One poster read, "Life is meaningless without the leader."
Thomas Wagner, Iraq Condemns U.N. Weapons Inspector, Associated Press, Oct. 12,1995,
available in WL, ALLNEWS Database.
372. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraqis Face Obvious Choice in Election, EDMONTON J.,
Oct. 15, 1995, at A2, available in WL, ALLNEWS Database. U.S. officials "think that
Iraq's revelations [regarding its weapons programs] will delay the debate at least until
spring [of 1996]." Robin Wright, U.N. Sifts New Iraqi Documents on Arms, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1995, at A7.
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stated that it has the authority to implement another prohibition
against Iraqi oil and related financial transactions if Iraq disregards
Governing Council decisions in the future.3 73  This means that
the UNSC will remain seized 374 of the issue of compensation for
many years to ensure that Iraq's efforts to lift the sanctions were
not merely part of a masquerade.
The UNCC already has achieved significant accomplishments,
regardless of what the future holds. The UNCC's progressive rules
allow more individuals, who have been traditionally
underrepresented in international claims fora, to bring claims. To
many individuals who suffered losses, the recent payment of some
"B" claims brings relief in more than just a monetary sense.
Claimants feel compensated by the fact that the international
community has made Iraq pay for its acts of aggression and
international wrongs. The UNSC has established a process that
has begun to work, albeit imperfectly.
The UNCC has developed into a fruitful endeavor. The
UNCC has established numerous precedents, with more undoubt-
edly still to come. Through time and practice, the UNCC's
precedents might crystalize into new international law. The
international community may redress the UNCC's shortcomings in
the future, much as the UNCC represents an effort to improve
upon previous international claims settlements. The UNCC serves
as a model on which the international community can build future
international claims settlement mechanisms.
Gregory Townsend
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374. See U.N. CHARTER art. 12.
* J.D. candidate, Loyola Law School, 1996; M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993; DiplOme d'tudes Supdrieures, Institut Universitaire de
Hautes btudes Internationales, Universitd de Genive, 1993; B.A., UCLA, 1988. I wish to
thank Camilla Foltz, Ada Berman, Michael D'Angelo, Jadene Derr, and Jeff Lewis for
their expert editing. I dedicate this Comment to my mother and the memory of Florence
Aron McKee, for their love and support.
1995] 1027

